NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 29 | Number 2

Article 4

2-1-1951

Notes and Comments
North Carolina Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
North Carolina Law Review, Notes and Comments, 29 N.C. L. Rev. 169 (1951).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol29/iss2/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Notice and Opportunity for HearingTax Assessment Statute
It is a fundamental concept of constitutional law that a person shall
-not be deprived of his property without due process of law. 1 Notice
and an opportunity for a hearing are essential to due process. As
applied to the field of taxation the same principle obtains, but it is obvious that what constitutes adequate notice and hearing in a strict
judicial sense is not necessarily the form that is required in view of
the exigencies of taxation. Accordingly the rule of general application
is that the taxpayer, at some point before the assessment becomes
irrevocably fixed, must be apprised of it and must have an opportunity
to be heard as to its validity and amount.2 The Supreme Court of the
United States in construing this principle has held it does not require
notice before the original assessment is made.3 While some of the
court's language would seem to require the notice to be provided for in
1U.
S. CoNsT. AmEND. XIV §1: "All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
N. C. CONST. Art. I §17: "No person ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed or exiled, or in any
manner deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the law of the land."
2 Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 393 (1934) ; McGregor v. Hogan, 263 U. S.
234 (1923) ; Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Nevada, 248 U. S. 165 (1918) ; Security Trust
Co. v. Lexington, 203 U. S. 323 (1906); Weyerhauser v. Minnesota, 176 U. S.
550 (1899); Hagar v. Reclamation District No. 108, 111 U. S. 701 (1883); Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 (1877) ; State Tax Commission v. Bailey &
Howard, 179 Ala. 620, 60 So. 913 (1912); Powell v. Gleason, 50 Ariz. 542, 74
P. 2d 47 (1937) ; People v. Skinner, 18 Cal. 2d 349, 115 P. 2d 488 (1941) ; Town
of West Hartford v. Coleman, 88 Conn. 78, 89 Atl. 1120 (1914) ;: Jones v. City
of Arcadia, 147 Fla. 571, 3 So. 2d 338 (1941); Anderson v. City of Ocala, 67
Fla. 204, 64 So. 775 (1914); Hardin v. Reynolds, 189 Ga. 534, 6 S. E. 2d 328
(1939) ; Barnett v. Cook County, 388 Ill. 251, 57 N. E. 2d 873 (1944) ; Chicago
& N. W. Ry. v. Board of Sup'rs of Hamilton County, 182 Iowa' 60, 162 N. W.
868, on rehearing, 165 N. W. 390 (1917) ; Board of Com'rs of Shawnee County
v. Wright, 153 Kan. 19, 109 P. 2d 184 (1941); Draffen v. City of Paducah, 215
Ky. 139, 284 S. W. 1027 (1926) ; State v. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana, 188 La.
978, 178 So. 601 (1937); Henry v. Manzella, 356 Mo. 305, 201 S. W. 2d 457
(1947) ; Thomas v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 192 Okla. 409, 136 P. 2d 929 (1943) ;
Oblon County v. Coulter, 153 Tenn. 469, 284 S. W. 372 (1924) ; Texas Pipe Line
v. Anderson, 100 S. W. 2d 754 (Tex. 1937) ; Elkins v. Millard County Drainage
District No. 3, 77 Utah 303, 294 P. 307 (1930) ; Clark v. City of Burlington, 101
Vt. 391, 143 Atl. 677 (1928) ; Snohomish County v. Andrews, 144 Wash. 320, 259
P. 851 (1927).
' Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 393 (1934) ; McGregor v. Hogan, 263 U. S.
234 (1923) ; Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Nevada, 248 U. S. 165 (1918) ; Security Trust
Co. v. Lexington, 203 U. S. 323 (1906).
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the tax statute,4 later cases have held that it is sufficient for due process
if the taxpayer has the right to contest the tax in an action for its
collection or in a suit to enjoin the taxY In short, so long as the taxpayer can present his case as a matter of right, before the court, whether
by the tax statute, a separate statute, or by the holdings of the court,
he has been afforded due process of law even though he had no notice
and hearing before the tax authorities. 6
In the case of Bowuie v. Town of West Jefferson" the Supreme

Court of North Carolina had an opportunity to consider specifically
what were the requirements of due process concerning a statute relating
to real property evaluation and taxation. The Town of West Jefferson
undertook to revalue the property within its corporate limits pursuant
to authority to do so conferred upon itself and another town by Chapter
627, Session Laws, 1947. Previously the municipality had used the
valuation placed thereon by the county authorities, namely $9,674.00. 8
The new valuation 'determined by the town through its newly created
board of assessment was $72,379.00. The municipal authorities had in
fact given the taxpayer notice and an opportunity to be heard but the
statute under which they acted did not require them to do so. The
taxpayer paid the town tax under protest and made a written demand
for the return of the difference between what he paid and what the tax
would have been upon the valuation set by the county. Upon the town's
refusal, the taxpayer brought suit under N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-406
(1943).9 The trial judge, sitting without a jury, ruled the statute under
'Central of Georgia Ry. v. Wright, 207 U. S. 127 (1907).
'Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 393 (1934) ; McGregor v. Hogan, 263 U.
234 (1923).
'Security Trust v. Lexington, 203 U. S. 323 (1906); Pittsburgh & Ry
Board of Public Works of West Virginia, 172 U. S. 32 (1898); Hagar
District, 111 U. S. 701 (1884) ; McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U. S.
Reclamation
(1877).
( 231 N. C. 408, 57 S. E. 2d 369 (1950).

S.

v.
v.
37

8 N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-333 (1943) says: . . . All cities and towns not
situated in more than one county shall accept the valuations fixed by the county
authorities, as modified by the state board of assessment. . .
N. C. GN. STAT. §105-406 (1943): "Unless a tax or assessment, or some
part thereof, be illegal or invalid, or be levied or' assessed for an illegal or unauthorized purpose, no injunction shall be granted by any court or judge to restrain the collection thereof in whole or in part, nor to restrain the sale of any
property for the nonpayment thereof; nor shall any court issue any order in claim
or delivery proceedings or otherwise for the taking of any personalty levied on by
the sheriff to enforce payment of such tax or assessment against the owner thereof.
Whenever any person shall claim to have a valid defense to the enforcement of a
tax or assessment charged or assessed upon his property or poll, such person
shall pay such tax or assessment to the sheriff; but if at the time of such paymernt, he shall notify the sheriff in wvriting that he pays the same under protest,
such payment shall be without prejudice to any defenses or rights he may have in
the premises, and he may, at any time within thirty days after such payment,
demand the same in writing from the treasurer of the state, ot of the county, city,
or town, for the benefit or under the authority or by the request of which the
same was levied; and if the same shall not be refunded within ninety days there-
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which the town acted unconstitutional as denying due process. The
supreme court affirmed saying that a statute which creates a board to
evaluate property for tax purposes must also provide the procedure by
which notice and an opportunity to be heard are afforded the taxpayer.
The court ignores the fact that the protesting taxpayer had been before
a trial court of general jurisdiction where his grievances could have been
heard and his rights protected pursuant to the statute under which the
action was brought.
In Caldwell Land & Lumber Co. v. Smith ° the county officials as
permitted by statute listed personal assets where the taxpayer had
omitted them. The taxpayer sought an injunction complaining that he
had not been given any notice or opportunity to be heard on the assessment. The statute made no provision for notice or opportunity to be
heard at any time. The trial judge made no findings of fact but continued the injunction until final hearing. The Supreme Court of North
Carolina in affirming this order asserted as to the lack of notice: "We
are clearly of the opinion that either the assessment is void and should
be so declared or that the plaintiff should have an opportunity to contest all the questions in the court which would have been open to it if
notice had been given at the inception of the matter." The court further
suggested that the legislature consider amending the statute to provide
for notice to the taxpayer. However, all the court decided in the
absence of any finding of fact by the trial judge was that the injunction
be continued. On a later appeal of the same case it was held that since
the taxpayer had been given a hearing in the court below his objection
to lack of notice was no longer valid."'
In Kinston v. Loftin12 the municipal authorities proceeded under a
statute which provided for a special assessment but made no provision
for notice to the taxpayer. The statute did, however, provide that the
city could bring action for the collection of the assessment and that in
such suit the taxpayer could raise any defense available to him.' 3 The
board of aldermen gave no notice or opportunity for the taxpayer to
appear before them until after the assessment was made. The court
after, may sue such county, city, or town for the amount so demanded, including
in his action against the county both state and county tax; and if upon the trial
it shall be determined that such tax or any part thereof was levied or assessed
for an illegal or unauthorized purpose, or was for any reason invalid or excessive,
"
For similar statute see N. C. GEN.
judgment shall be rendered therefore ...
STAT. §105-267 (1943).
10 146 N. C. 199, 59 S. E. 653 (1907).
" Caldwell Land and Lumber Co. v. Smith, 151 N. C. 70, 65 S. E. 641 (1909).
a' 149 N. C. 255, 62 S. E. 1069 (1908).
"

Private Laws 1905, c. 338 which said taxpayer

"...

shall have the right to

deny the whole, or any part, of the amount claimed to be due by the city, and to
plead any irregularity in reference to the assessment or any fact relied upon, to
question the legality of the assessment, and the issues raised shall be tried, and the
cause disposed of according to law. .. ."
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held that the opportunity afforded by the statute to contest the assessment in the suit for collection satisfied the requirements of due process. 14
While the cases of Caldwell Land & Lumber Co. v. Smith and
Kinston v. Loftin appear to follow the rule that a hearing provided at
any stage whether before the court or the taxing authority constitutes
due process, later North Carolina cases tend to introduce some confusion
into our law. In Markham v. Carvzer'5 the State Tax Commission had
raised the value of personal property reported by the taxpayer. It was
held that the assessment could not be increased without notice and a
hearing as this was a denial of due process. The court, however, did
not consider whether the hearing could be had before the court apart
from the provisions of the tax statute. The decision would seem to
indicate that the opportunity afforded for a hearing must be before the
taxing authorities.
Likewise in Lexington v. Lopp in a per curiam opinion, 18 a special
assessment statute was held unconstitutional because the statute made
no sufficient provision for notice and an opportunity to be heard. It
would seem that the latter decisions and the principal case have concerned themselves solely with the question whether the assessment
statute provides for notice and an opportunity to be heard before the
taxing authorities. They have omitted idiscussion of whether any
method existed under our law apart from the statute itself for the
parties to get a hearing on the assessment. Nor have they considered
whether the hearing may be before a court as well as before the taxing
authority. While these cases might seem to indicate that the requirements of due process were more stringent in North Carolina than in
other jurisdictions, actually they tend to introduce obscurity into our
body of law. It would be desirable for statutes to provide for notice
and an opportunity for a hearing before the taxing authorities for they
are the expert bodies which should make an initial decision after hearing. Where no such statutory provision is made, our court is not
clear on whether notice and hearing provided by another statute, or
required by court decision, as part of the process of judicial review, is
sufficient.
KENNETH R. HOYLE.
For case involving the same statute, see Kinston v. Wooten, 150 N. C. 295,

63 S. E. 1061 (1909) ; a similar statute, see Tarboro v. Staton, 156 N. C. 504, 72
S. E. 577 (1911).
188 N. C. 615, 125 S. E. 409- (1924).
1C210 N. C. 196, 185 S. E. 766 (1936).
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Declaratory Judgments-Requisites for Jurisdiction
of Federal Question Cases-Suit by Alleged Patent Infringer
Under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act,' any court of the
United States may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declaration in a case of actual controversy
within its jurisdiction. As a condition precedent to the use of this
procedural device, the controversy must be one within the jurisdiction
of the federal court.2 Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution declares that this power shall extend to all cases ".... arising
under this Constitution, (or) the laws of the United States ...." Congress has declared that the district courts shall have original jurisdiction
over these "federal question cases." s
The exercise of jurisdiction by the -district courts over "federal
question cases" is controlled by several well settled rules promulgated
by the Supreme Court. First, the federal question must form an essential and original ingredient in such cases; i.e., it must appear that the
federal right asserted may be defeated by one construction of the Constitution or laws of the United States and sustained by the opposite
construction. 4 Second, not only must the federal right be an essential
ingredient of the cause of action, but it must also be set out in the
plaintiff's complaint. 5 The third rule qualifies the second in that the
plaintiff's cause of action itself must present a federal question, unaided
by allegations of anticipatory replies to probable defenses., It will be
noted that these rules restrict the jurisdictional limits of the federal
courts and narrow the opportunities for entrance into them.
In Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,7 M Pipe Line Company entered into a contract with P, prior to the construction of a natural gas pipe line, whereby the latter was to negotiate a series of
contracts to secure an adequate reserve of gas. The Natural Gas Act
148 STAr. §955 (1934), 28 U. S. C. §2201 (1948).
'The operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural only and does
not attempt to change the essential requisites for the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549 (1946) ; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293 (1943) ; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S.
227 (1937); Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U. S.288 (1935); Southern Pac. Co. v.
McAdoo, 82 F. 2d 121 (9th Cir. 1936).
' 18 STAT. §470 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §1331 (1948). For historical discussion
and development of these cases see: Bergman, Reappraisal of Federal Question
Jurisdiction,46 MicH. L. Rxv. 17 (1947); Chadbourn and Levin, OriginalJurisdiction of Federal Question, 90 U. oF PA. L. Rnv. 639 (1942) ; Forrester, Federal
Question Jurisdiction and Section 5, 18 TuI.AE L. Rxv. 263 (1943); Forrester,
The Nature of a Federal Question, 16 Tu.AxE L. Rv. 362 (1942).
' Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (U. S.1824).
'Tenn. v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U. S.454 (1894) ; Metcalf v. City of
Watertown, 128 U. S.586 (1888).
aTaylor v. Anderson, 234 U. S.74 (1913); Louisville & Nashville R. R. v.
Mottley, 211 U. S. 149 (1908). These rules were reiterated by Mr. Justice
Cardozo in Gully v. First Nat. Bank, 299 U. S.109 (1936).
'70 Sup. Ct. 876 (1950).
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prohibits the construction of such pipe lines unless a certificate of public convenience and necessity has been issued by the Federal Power
Commission, and a prerequisite to the issuance of such a certificate
is an adequate reserve of gas.8 The contracts negotiated by P with
the sellers all contained similar provisions allowing the sellers to terminate their obligations thereunder if such certificate had not been issued
to M Company before a specific date. Notice of issuance of the certificate was released two days prior to the cancellation date, but the actual
content of the order was not made public until the cancellation date.
The sellers served notice of termination, claiming no certificate had
been "issued" since issuance was conditional upon certain terms of the
order.0 Thereupon M Company and P brought suit against the sellers,
seeking a declaratory judgment that the contracts were still in effect
and binding upon the parties thereto. Jurisdiction was invoked on the
ground that this was a controversy arising under a federal law because
the Natural Gas Act and an order by the Federal Power Commission
had to be constructed and interpreted. The lower court held that it
had jurisdiction and granted the declaratory judgment.10 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether this case was "within
the jurisdiction" of the district court so as to enable it to render the
declaratory relief sought. The Court, with Mr. Justice Frankfurter
writing the majority opinion, held that "not every question of federal
law emerging in a suit is proof that a federal law is the basis of the
suit."" Had the plaintiff sought damages or specific performance, he
could have raised no federal question because such a suit would arise
under the state law governing the contract sued upon. Likewise he
could raise no federal question in a declaratory action on the contract
since the contract itself is the basis of the suit, and not some right or
immunity created by a federal law belonging to the plaintiff. Since
there was no diversity and the matter in controversy arose under state
law rather than under the laws of the United States, the Court concluded that the case was not originally within the jurisdiction of the
district court and that court had no authority to render a declaratory
judgment. Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that the Declaratory Judgment Act was merely an enlargement of the remedies available in the
federal courts; that it could only be used in a case of actutal controversy already within the jurisdiction of the federal court; and that
856 STAT. §83

(1942); 15 U. S. C. §717f (c) (1948).
' The issuance order was conditional upon M Company's obtaining approvals
of operation from the State of Wisconsin, and the communities to be served
therein, of its proposed financing by the S.E.C., and of its rate schedule. 70 Sup.
Ct. 876, 878 (1950).
10 174 F. 2d 89 (10th Cir. 1949).
The decision of the district court was not
filed for publication.
" Quoting from Gully v. First Nat. Bank, 299 U. S.109, 115 (1936).
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jurisdictional requirements were not altered by the Act. He reviewed
the three prerequisites to jurisdiction of "federal question cases" in coercive actions and held that these requirements must also be present
in a complaint which seeks a declaratory judgment.1 2 Thus, the result
seems to be that the plaintiff in "federal question cases," whether seeking a declaratory or coercive judgment, must allege in his complaint as
an essential element of his cause of action a federally protected right,
which belongs to him and which is questioned, as a basis of jurisdiction.
Neither the defendants' answer nor an anticipatory reply, asserted in
the complaint, to a probable defense can aid in tletermining the jurisdictional question.
This decision dearly does not destroy all "federal question" jurisdiction in declaratory judgment proceedings. A plaintiff may still seek a
declaratory judgment if he asserts in his complaint a federal right which
is questioned and is essential to his cause of action.' 3 It is rather in
those cases in which the plaintiff has no such right, but in his complaint
alleges, as a basis of federal jurisdiction, an anticipatory reply to some
probable defense that this decision denies federal jurisdiction.' 4 This
seems a logical result since Congress, in creating this new remedy, stated
that it may be used in those cases uithin the jurisdiction of the district
court.15 The language used by the Court in the principal case to defeat jurisdiction is by no means new to declaratory proceedings, as the
lower federal courts have often adopted similar language in such
proceedings.' 6
1 "To sanction suits for declaratory relief as within the jurisdiction of the
district court merely because, as in this case, artful pleading anticipates a defense
based on federal law, would contravene the whole trend of jurisdictional legislation

by Congress, disregard the effective functioning of the federal judicial system and
distort the limited procedural purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act." 70
Sup. Ct. 876, 880 (1950).
11Great Lakes Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293 (1942) (interstate commerce);
Regents of N. M. College v. Albuquerque Broadcasting Co., 158 F. 2d 900 (10th
Cir. 1947) (F.C.C.) ; Bradford v. City of Somerset, Ky., 138 F. 2d 308 (6th
Cir. 1943) (right asserted under Civil Rights Act) ; Smith v. Am. Asiatic Underwriters, Federal, 127 F. 2d 754 (9th Cir. 1942) (China Trade Act) ; Fox v. 34
Hillside Realty Corp., 79 F. Supp. 832 (S.D. N. Y. 1948) (Rent Control Act;
federal question raised, but action dismissed because less than $3000 involved);
Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890 (D.Wyo. 1945) (suit brought by a state);
Sunshine Mining Co. v. Craver, 34 F. Supp. 274 (N. D. Idaho 1940) (F. L. S.A.) ;
Dixon v. Cleveland, 31 F. Supp. 1010 (W. D. S. C. 1940) (National Bankruptcy
Act).
1,One writer has stated that this rule should not apply to declaratory actions.
Note,
1 44 ILL. L. REv. 827, 831 (1950).
4 Diggs v. Pa. Public Utility Comm., 180 F. 2d 623 (3rd Cir. 1950); West
Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 138 F. 2d 320 (9th Cir. 1943); Hary v. United
Elec. Coal Co., 8 F. Supp. 655 (E. D. Ill. 1934); BoRcHARD, DEcLARAoRaY JUDGMENTS
233 (2nd ed. 1941).
1

Magic Foam Sales Corp. v. Mystic Foam Corp., 167 F. 2d 88 (6th Cir.
1948) ; Wells v. Universal Pictures Co., 166 F. 2d 690 (2nd Cir. 1948) ; Atlantic
Meat Co. v. R.F.C., 166 F. 2d 51 (1st Cir. 1948): State Auto. Ins. Ass'n v.
Parry, 123 F. 2d 243 (8th Cir. 1941); Love v. U. z.. 1081 F. 2d 43 (8th Cir.
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Probably the greatest effect of this decision, if carried to its logical
conclusion, will be upon declaratory actions commenced by an alleged
infringer to have the defendant's patent declared invalid and not infringed upon by the plaintiff. Generally, in such cases, the defendant
patent holder is disrupting the plaintiff's business by threatening the
plaintiff with a patent infringement suit, and by writing the plaintiff's
customers that the plaintiff is infringing his patent and that if they
continue to deal with him, they will also be guilty of infringement.
Before the passage of the Declaratory Judgment Act, the alleged infringer had no remedy in the federal courts, since he could assert no
right or immunity, created by the laws of the United States, belonging
to him.17 But, since the passage of the Act in 1934, the lower federal
courts have consistently held that such declaratory actions "arise under"
the patent laws, and thus are within their jurisdiction, since an essential
ingredient of the plaintiff's cause of action is the nonexistence of a

federal right in the defendant.1 8 The court of appeals in Edelmann &

Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co.,10 recognizing that the owner of the patent
might sue to enjoin infringement, stated that ". . . now the alleged infringer may sue ....
It is of no moment, in the determination of the
character of the relief sought, that the suit is brought by the alleged
infringer instead of by the owner." 20 It is to be noted in these actions
that the defendant's patent must be an essential element of the cause
of action for jurisdiction to prevail; it is not sufficient that it be lurking
in the background. 21
1939); McCarth v. Watt, 89 F. Supp. 841 (D. Mass. 1950); Money v. Wallin,

88 F. Supp, 980 (E. D. Pa. 1950); Ambassade Realty Corp. v. Winkler, 83 F.

Supp. 227 (D. Mass. 1949) ; Minneapolis Grain Exchange v. Farmers Union Grain
Terminal Ass'n, 75 F. Supp. 577 (D. Minn. 1947); Meredith v. Carter, 49 F.
Supp. 899 (N. D. Ind. 1943) ; Carlson v. Betmar Hats, 47 F. Supp. 86 (S. D. N. Y.
1942) ; Los Angeles Soap Co. v. Rogan, 14 F. Supp. 112 (S. D. Cal. 1936).
"'Am.
Wells Works Co. v. Layne Co., 241 U. S. 257 (1916).
8
Measurement Corp. v. Ferris Instru. Corp., 159 F. 2d 590 (3rd Cir. 1947);
Grip Nut Co. v. Sharp, 124 F. 2d 814 (7th Cir. 1941); Chicago Metallic Mfg.
Co. v. Edward Katzinger Co., 123 F. 2d 518 (7th Cir. 1941) ; Hook v. Hook &
Ackerman, 89 F. Supp. 238 (W. D. Pa. 1950) ; Tuthill v. Wilsey, 85 F. Supp. 586
(N. D. Ill. 1949); Adorjan Newman Co. v. Richelieu Corp., 81 F. Supp. 763
(S. D. N. Y. 1948); Keyes Fibre Co. v. Chaplin Corp., 76 F. Supp. 981 (D. Me.
1947) ; Petesime Incubator Co. v. Bundy Incubator Co., 43 F. Supp. 446 (S. D.
Ohio 1942); Ice Plan Equip. Co. v. Martocello, 43 F. Supp. 281 (E. D. Pa.
1941); Bakelite Corp. v. Lubri-Zol Development Corp., 34 F. Supp. 142 (D. Del.
1940); Mitchell & Weber v. Williamsbridge Mills, 14 F. Supp. 954 (S. D. N. Y.
1936), 45 YALE L. J. 1287; Lionel Corp. v. De Filippis, 11 F. Supp. 712 (E. D.
N. Y. 1935); Zenie Bros. v. Miskend, 10 F. Supp. 779 (S. D. N. Y. 1935).
1988 F. 2d 852 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 300 U. S. 680 (1937).
"In only one case did a district court hold that this type case did not arise
under the patent laws. International Harvest Hat Co. v. Caradine Hat Co., 17
F. Supp. 79 (E. D. Mo. 1935). The Edelmaint case declined to follow this
decision.
"Eckert v. Braun, 155 F. 2d 517 (7th Cir. 1946) (patent obtained from plaintiff by fraud); Karen Inc. v. Perlitch, 87 F. Supp. 784 (S. D. N. Y. 1949) (contract for royalties under a patent) ; Atlas Imperial Diesel Engine Co. v. Lanova
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The principal case seems to exclude these declaratory actions by the
alleged infringer from the district court's jurisdiction by stating that
the plaintiff's claim itself must present a federal question unaided by
anything alleged in anticipation of a defense that the defendant may set
up. Certainly an alleged infringer can assert no claim which presents
a federal question. Does this decision thus shut the doors of the federal courts to such actions and place the alleged infringer again irk the
position he occupied before the enactment of the Declaratory Judgment
Act?
Assuming that it does, what relief would be obtainable in a state
court by the alleged infringer? The district court in Zenie Bros. v.
Miskend22 discussed some of the remedies available. They are: (1)
suit for unfair competition;2 (2) petition to the Attorney General to
bring suit in behalf of the United States to revoke the patent for
fraud ;24 and (3) suit for damages to business caused by a threat to
sue under the patent laws. 25 The court recognized that none of these
remedies are adequate since they do not settle the fundamental rights
of the parties or the validity of the defendant's patent.
One of the primary reasons for restricting the limits of federal
jurisdiction in the ordinary situation is the fact that an adequate remedy
lies in the state courts, and the federal courts -do not wish to interfere
with them. But here, there is no adequate state remedy, and if the
federal courts deny relief, the alleged infringer has no adquate relief
in any court and is powerless to prevent the destruction of his business.
This factor seems sufficient to justify federal courts in retaining jurisdiction of this type suit. Other considerations bolster this conclusion.
The intent of Congress was to create a haven in the federal courts for
Writers are in accord
all cases which arise under the patent laws.&2
2T
that such controversies are within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Corp., 79 F. Supp. 1002 (D.Del. 1948) (contract inre patent) ;Bettis v.PatersonBallagh Corp., 16 F. Supp. 455 (S. D. Cal. 1936) (contract of assignment of
patent).
22 10 F. Supp. 779, 782 (S. D. N. Y. 1935).
2 This is available to plaintiff only if he can prove that the defendant's threats
were made without the intent to follow them up with an infringment suit. Racine
Paper Goods Co. v. Dittgen, 171 Fed. 631 (7th Cir. 1909); Adriance Platt &
Co. v. Nat. Harrow Co., 121 Fed. 827 (2nd Cir. 1903) ; Emack v. Kane, 34 Fed.
46 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1888).
" This it not a remedy of the plaintiff, and he has no way to compel such a
suit. U. S. v. Am. Bell Telephone Co., 167 U. S. 224 (1896).
"Am. Wells Works Co. v. Layne Co., 241 U. S. 257 (1916).
"8It was not the intention of Congress to permit patent owners in patent controversies to avoid the application of the declaratory judgment statute. Bakelite
Corp. v. Lubri-Zol Development Corp., 34 F. Supp. 142 (D. Del. 1940). 36 STAT.
§1092 (1911), 28 U. S.C.§1338 (1948).
',"The defendant has really raised the issue and the plaintiff seeks only formal
adjudication. Any other view would be extraordinary." BORcHARD, DECLARATORY
". . . the Act enables the plaintiff to state -an
JUDGMENT 809 (2nd ed. 1941).
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It may be noted that the Supreme Court in the principal case did not
mention the problem, but it did cite with approval a note on the development of declaratory judgments, which, on the very page cited by the
Court, approves of federal jurisdiction of a suit for declaration of noninfringement and invalidity of defendant's patent.28 The Supreme
Court has had previous opportunities to review these declaratory actions
by the alleged infringer, but has denied suth review.
Although the language of the principal case seems to withdraw from
federal jurisdiction declaratory actions brought by an alleged infringer,
it is suggested that they should retain jurisdiction of such actions. A
suit to have a patent declared invalid is one arising under the patent
laws in substance just as much as the ordinary suit for infringement
since the validity of the patent is the immediate as well as the ultimate
issue in the case. 30 The inadequacy of state remedies, and other factors previously considered, would seem to be sufficient for the federal
courts to' make an exception of these suits, 31 and to retain jurisdiction
over them, although logically they fall within the language of the principal case.
WILLIAM E. GREENE.
Domestic Relations-Loss of Consortium from
Injury to Spouse
Plaintiff brought suit to recover damages for loss of consortium
resulting from the negligent injury of her husband. The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia circuit in Hitaffer v.
Argonne Co.,' allowed recovery, declining to align itself with unanimous
authority to the contrary in other jurisdictions.
original cause of action which is directly based on the invalidity of the defendant's patent... ." Note, 45 YALE L. J. 1287, 1289. MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE
U. S. JUDICIAL CODE 149 (1949). ToumMN, HANDB00K OF PATrErs 506 (1949).
" Note, Developments in the Law-Declaratory Judgments-1941-1949, 62
HARV. L. REV. 787, 803 (1949).

"' Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U. S. 560 (1948) (jurisdiction not mentioned); Crosley Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 130 F. Zd 474 (3rd
Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 681 (1942); Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty
Co., 88 F. 2d 852.(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 300 U. S. 680 (1937) ; Petesime Incubator
Co. v. Bundy Incubator Co., 43 F. Supp. 446 (S. D. Ohio 1942), aff'd, 135 F. 2d
580, appeal dismissed, 320 U. S. 805 (1943).
'0 Zenie Bros. v. Miskend, 10 F. Supp. 779 (S. D. N. Y. 1935).
"1A well settled exception to the rule that the plaintiff must assert a federal
right which belongs to him is an action to remove a cloud upon plaintiff's title
where the alleged cloud arises from a federal grant to the defendant.

".

. . the

existence and invalidity of the instrument or record sought to be eliminated as a
cloud are essential parts of the plaintiff's cause of action and must be alleged in
the bill." Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U. S. 486, 490 (1917).
1 Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F. 2d 811
(D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 71 Sup.
Ct. 80 (1950).
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Consortium has been variously defined2 and confusion has arisen as
to its exact meaning. In general terms it is an interest of a spouse in
that relationship which exists between husband and wife who have been
united by some form of marriage which the law recognizes. Consortium
originated as an exclusive right of the husband.3 The husband's interest
in the marital relationship was the first to receive recognition and was
based on his wife's services to him as his servant. 4 Over a period of
time this interest grew into a broader concept including services, society,
and the right to the exclusive sexual intercourse of the wife. Modern
law has added the fourth element of conjugal affection, but the right to
exclusive sexual intercourse may be properly thought of as being embraced within the meaning of the term conjugal affection. As the
concept expanded, attempts were made to divide the component parts
into services on the one hand and "sentimental" elements on the other,
and to permit recovery for the former but not for the latter. 5 But in
recent years there has been a shift in emphasis from loss of services
which earlier was indispensable, and now in general interference with
any one of these elements will give rise to a cause of action in a jurisdiction recognizing the interest. The married women's acts confronted courts with additional problems as to whether consortium had
become a mutual right inherent in the relationship of marriage or had
been destroyed altogether. Further complicating the question, attempts
have been made to distinguish between invasions of the consortium
classed as negligent (personal injury to the other spouse which concomitantly injures the marital interest) and intentional or direct invasions
(alienation of affections and criminal conversation). Consequently the
concept has become clouded with uncertainty. 6
At common law, an injury to the person of the wife gave rise to two
causes of action: (1) that of the wife individually for personal loss and
injuries, enforced through the husband; and (2) that of the husband
for damages to his marital interests such as loss of his wife's services,
'"The word consortium includes aid, society, companionship, assistance, and
affection, and the law does not attempt to separate these elements of damages."

Little Rock Gas & Fuel Co. v. Coppege, 116 Ark. 334, 172 S. W. 885 (1915);

"The right of the husband and wife respectively, to the conjugal fellowship, com-

pany, cooperation and aid of the other."-Bouvier; "The companionship or society
of a wife."-Black.
'BL.

'See

(1925).

Comm. 142.
Warren, Husband's Right to Wife's Services, 38

HARv.

L. RFv. 421

'Blair v. Seitner Dry Goods Co., 184 Mich. 304, 151 N. W. 724 (1915) (recovery according to pecuniary value of lost services only allowed). Golden v.
R. L. Greene Paper Co., 44 R. I. 231, 116 Atl. 579 (1922) (testimony by husband
that he could no longer have sexual intercourse with wife as a result of injuries
sustained by her ruled inadmissible).
'See Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 MICH. L. Rzv.
1 (1923); Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 CoL L. REv. 651 (1930).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

society, and earnings; or for damages by reason of his being put to expense. The wife had no corresponding right to sue for injury to her
husband.
At common law, the wife had no right of action for either the intentional or the negligent invasion of the consortium.7 The reasons for
this are not altogether clear, but essentially it would seem to have been
the result of the merger of her legal identity into that of her husband to
such an extent that the right was extinguished; or the fact that she could
not sue for any purpose except through her husband. This latter procedural impediment would have led to considerable difficulty. In cases
of injury to him, he had his own cause of action for personal injury
and if the wife had been permitted to sue for loss of consortium as a
result of this injury, the husband would have been joined as plaintiff,
anl would have collected the damages in both actions. It would have
been simpler merely to have allowed the husband to collect in one action
rather than two. Furthermore, in suits based on alienation of affections
or criminal conversation, the wife would have been forced to sue through
the husband, who was himself a wrongdoer, and he would have been
entitled to the proceeds of the suit and would have thus profited by his
own wrong. On the other hand, the husband had an unlimited right of
action for either the intentional or negligent injury to his consortium8
because he was entitled to his wife's services and earnings as a matter
of proprietary right and could recover for their loss.
The effect of the married women's acts and other equalizing and
enabling legislation has necessarily influenced courts in their attempts
to settle the present status of the right of recovery for injury to the
consortium. The authorities have taken divergent views. The great
weight of authority allows the husband to recover for either the negligent or the intentional injury to the consortium,0 but allows the wife
to recover only for the intentional or legally malicious injury to the
" ".

.

. the inferior hath no kind of property in the company, care, or assistance

142.
of the
8 superior, . .. and therefore can suffer no loss or injury." 3 BL. Co011.
E.g., Lindsey v. Kindt, 221 Ala. 169, 128 So. 143 (1930) (provided husband
not contributorily negligent); Union Pac. Ry. v. Jones, 21 Colo. 340, 40 Pac.
891 (1895) ; Newhirter v. Hatten, 42 Iowa 288, 20 Am. Rep. 618 (1875) ; Blair
v. Chicago & A. Ry., 89 Mo. 334. 1 S. W. 367 (1886); Bedell v. Mandel,
108 N. J. L. 22, 155 Atl. 383 (Sup. Ct. 1931) ; Robinson v. Lockridge, 230 App.

Div. 389, 244 N. Y. S. 663 (4th Dep't 1930) ; Cook v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 196
S. C. 230, 13 S. E. 2d 1 (1941).
'E.g., Southern Ry. v. Crowder, 135 Ala. 417, 33 So. 335 (1902)

(that wife

must sue alone for personal injury does not prevent husband recovering for loss
of consortium); Louisville & N. R. v. Kinman, 182 Ky. 597, 206 S. W. 880
(1918) (wife's right of action for injuries personal to her does not preclude
husband's right for loss of consortium) ; Mageau v. Great Northern Ry., 103 Minn.
290, 115 N. W. 651 (1908); Omaha & R. V. Ry. v. Chollette, 41 Neb. 578, 59
N. W. 921 (1894); Booth v. Manchester St. Ry., 73 N. H. 529, 63 Atl. 578
(1906); Baltimore & 0. Ry. v. Glenn, 66 Ohio St. 395, 64 N. E. 438 (1902);

Elling v. Blake-McFall Co., 85 Ore. 91, 166 Pac. 57 (1917).
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consortium.'
Since the trend in legislation has been toward legal
equality between husband and wife, it would seem to follow that if the
husband is allowed the right, the wife ought also be allowed it. But
courts which are not inclined to accept this view point out the following distinctions between the husband and wife which were not altered
by the married women's statutes: the husband is still the head of the
household and represents its interests; he has the legal duty to support
his wife and children; he still has a limited though substantial right to
his wife's services; and she is entitled to his support and will profit
indirectly by any recovery he may have. The married women's acts
are strictly construed as being in derogation of the common law; and
since the wife did not have the right at common law and since it has
not been conferred upon her by statute, she does not now have the right.
Courts which emphasize the service element of consortium point out
that the wife still has no right to her husband's services.
Other courts follow the same reasoning as to the wife's right, but
in deference to the intent of the legislature to put both husband and
wife on an equal basis, now dieny the husband's right for negligent injury also," upon the premise that his common law right was based
upon loss of services, and while the other elements of consortium might
be considered in aggravation of damages, standing alone they do not
constitute a cause of action. Therefore, since the married women's acts
secure to the wife the right to her earnings from services outside the
household or business of the husband, the true basis of his former right
is now removed.
The majority of courts, however, which allow the husband to recover take two approaches: (1) the theory that loss of services is not
the essential element of consortium and the husband can recover whether
the invasion involved one or the other elements because the action itself
was per quod consortium amisit, not per quod servitum; (2) even if
loss of services were considered essential, the husband is still entitled
to his wife's services rendered in his household or business, just as she
is entitled to his support, and since the enabling and equalizing statutes
do not deal with the remedies of which the husband may avail himself,2
he has all the remedy he ever had, in so far as his right still exists.1
In North Carolina, the Constitution of 1868 and subsequent statutes' 3 wiped away the conception of ownership of the wife by the
10 Emerson v. Taylor, 133 Md. 192, 104 Atl. 538 (1918).

2tMarri v. Stamford St. Ry., 84 Conn. 9, 78 AtI. 582 (1911); Whitcomb
v. New York, etc. Ry., 215 Mass. 440, 102 N. E. 663 (1913); Blaiir v. Seitner
DryGoods Co., 184 Mich. 304, 151 N. W. 724 (1915).
Guevin v. Manchester St. Ry., 78 N. H. 289, 99 At. 298 (1916).
13
N. C. CoxsT. Art. X, §6.
N. C. GEN. STAT. §52-1 (1943) : "The real and personal property of any female
in this state, acquired before marriage, and all property, real and personal, to
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They provided that the wife could own real and personal

property; that she was entitled to earnings from her services; that damages for personal injuries belonged to her; and that damages for torts
against her could be recovered by her suing alone. 14 Therefore the
husband cannot sue to recover damages for torts committed on the wife,
nor can the wife sue for damages for torts committed on the husband.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has furnished some landmark decisions on this question. Three cases", recognized the common
law right of the husband to recover even though based on negligence
and the implication of these cases seems to be that injury to the nonservice elements of consortium should be recognized as giving rise to
a cause of action. It is significant that one of these16 was decided after
the 1913 statute (N. C. GEN. STAT. §52-10) to which no reference was
made. And in an epic opinion written by Chief Justice Clark in Hipp
v. Dupont,17 the first decision of its kind to be reported, the wife re-

covered damages for loss of consortium resulting from the negligent
injury of her husband. The important distinction was made between
recovery by one spouse for torts committed on the other, and recovery
by either spouse for injury to the consortium arising out of this tortious
injury. The cause of action was not for injury to the husband, but for
injury to the wife which she suffered as a member of the marital union
and as a result of the injury received by the husband. It was said that
the wife sustained damages which, though flowing from the injury to

her husband, are entirely separate and distinct, personal and direct,
and not remote or consequential, arising out of the nature of the marwhich she may, after marriage, become in any manner entitled, shall be and
remain the sole and separate estate and property of such female, and shall not
be liable for any debts, obligations or engagements of her husband, and may be
devised and bequeathed, and, with the written assent of her husband, conveyed by
her as if she were unmarried."
"1N. C. GEN. STAT. §52-10 (1943): "The earnings of a married woman by
virtue of any contract for her personal service, and any damages for personal injuries, or other tort sustained by her, can be recovered by her suing alone, and
such earnings or recovery shall be her sole and separate property as fully as if
she had remained unmarried.'
"'Bailey v. Long, 172 N. C. 661, 90 S. E. 809 (1916) (wife contracted pneumonia and died due to negligence of defendant, husband recovered for expenses,
mental sufferings and injury to his feelings in witnessing! wife's suffering, "...
and in the act and article of death resulting therefrom.") ; Kimberly v. Howland,
143 N. C. 399, 55 S. E. 778 (1906). (If injury to wife is such that the husband
receives a separate loss or damage, as where he is put to expense, or is deprived
of the society or the services of his wife, he is entitled to recover) ; Holleman v.
Harward, 119 N. C. 150, 25 S. E. 972 (1896) (defendants, druggists, sold laudanum to wife, knowing that she was using it as a beverage, over the warnings and
protests of the husband, as a result of which she became a mental and physical
wreck, causing loss to husband of her companionship and services; held, husband
may recover).
Bailey v. Long, 172 N. C. 661, 90 S. E. 809 (1916).
T
" Hipp v. Dupont, 182 N. C. 9, 108 S.E. 318 (1921).
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riage relationship. They were damages for which the husband could
not recover.
Three years later, after the death of Chief Justice Clark, and with
two new justices on the court, the question was faced again in a case
identical in all important particulars with the Hipp case. Yet recovery
unfortunately was denied in Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co.i ' The
court held that under the doctrine of marital equality, either husband or wife may sue only for loss of consortium due to direct and
intentional invasion. It is not made clear why this was thought to be
so, except that the court felt that the husband had been deprived by
statute of his common law right, presumably the right arising from
the negligent injury alone. As to recovery for loss of consortium by
the wife, the Hipp case was overruled. The Hipp case distinction as
to the nature of the injury involved was not dealt with; the court refusing to recognize that loss of consortium is a direct injury to either
spouse. In the latest North Carolina decision1 9 it was held that N. C.
GEN. STAT. §52-10 had the effect of depriving the husband of his common law cause of action for loss of the consortium due to negligent
injury to the wife. This equalizes the rights of the spouses, the wife
having been denied an action in the Hinunt case.20
The Hitaffer case asserts that the separation of consortium into
services and companionship and the emphasis upon services, which some
jurisdictions have seized upon to deny recovery, is a result of redundant
common law pleading rather than conscious, reasoned division; the
separation being without precedent in -common law decisions. It discounted the reasoning of courts which hold that the sentimental or nonservice elements (essentially the only ones remaining after the marriect
women's acts) are too indirect and consequential to be compensable
under the law of damages in negligence cases, pointing out that this.
reasoning is not followed where the husband is allowed the right of
action for loss of consortium, or in actions for alienation of affections
and criminal conversation where loss of services is not involved.
Two views can be fairly taken on this question. Either both husband and wife must be denied the action on the grounds that there is
no such protectable interest as consortium, or the interest must be
recognized as being protectable and mutual, allowing both the cause of
action.
MARVIN P. HOGAN.
18189
N.
C.
120,
126
S.
E.
307
(1924).
18
Helnistetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N. C. 821, 32 S. E. 2d 611 (1945)
(the court regarded the statute as controlling, yet cited Bailey v. Long, 172 N. C.
661, 90 S. E. 809 (1916) which was decided after the statute was passed).
20 189 N. C. 120, 126 S. E. 307 (1924). The Hi6pf case was cited only for
the proposition that "the two are on a parity in respect to such suits" (p. 825).
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Habeus Corpus-Right of State Prisoner to Seek Writ
in Federal Courts
When a North Carolina prisoner, during the course of his trial,
raises a constitutional question based on denial of due process, it is
well established that this question may be presented to the state supreme
court on appeal.' Upon failure to raise the question during the trial,
he may, by timely motion, move for a new trial 2 at which time the question may be raised. Only until recently, however, was there a "judicial
intimation" of the procedure which he should follow once he failed to
make such timely motion. This suggestion by the court was to petition
for a writ of error coram nobis. The uncertainty encompassing the
propriety of this petition has since been removed,4 and an old common
law writ of procedure has been revived, through which such questions
may now reach the state's highest court. But if relief is denied there,
then what?
It is settled law that state prisoners must exhaust their state remedies
before petitioning the federal courts for a writ of habeas corpus, based
upon a question of due process; and where more than one procedural
remedy is available in the state court, only one need be exhausted before
relief is sought in the federal couits.5 What constitutes an exhaustion
of one's state remedies, however, has not been so clear.
In Fx parte Hawk8 it was held that the state remedy included an
application for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States, and that ordinarilya petition for a writ of habeas corpus would
not be entertained by the lower federal courts until all the state remedies
had been exhausted. The Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges
later proposed a statute, which since has been enacted into law, 7 in
which the Conference intended to incorporate this -Ioctrine. 8 Actually
the Conference intended that the statute should close the doors of the
IN.C. GEr. STAT. §15-180 (1943).

§§15-174, 1-207 (1943).
re Taylor, 229 N. C. 297, 49 S. E. 2d 749 (1948), Note, 27 N. C. L. REv.
254 (1949).
' State v. Daniels, 231 N. C. 17, 56 S. E. 2d 2 (1949) (application must be
made to the supreme court for permission to apply for writ in the superior court
in which case was tried) ; State v. Daniels, 231 N. C. 341, 56 S.E. 2d 646 (1949)
(petition must present prima facie substantial merit sufficient to bring it within
purview of writ) ; State v. Daniels, 232 N. C. 196, 59 S.E. 2d 430 (1950) (petition
must be based on matters "extraneous to the record").
'Wade v. Mayo, 334 U. S.672 (1947) ; see Application of Middlebrooks, 88 F.
Supp. 943 (S.D. Cal. 1950) (where prisoner is in custody of one state for extradition to another, he need exhaust only the remedies of one state).
a321 U. S.114 (1944) ; accord, White v. Ragen, 324 U. S.760 (1945).
"62 STAT. 967 (1948), 28 U. S. C. §2254 (Supp. 1949) (Reviser's note-"This
new section is declaratory of existing law as affirmed by the Supreme Court.").
'See Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F. R. D. 171, 177 (1948)
("One of the incidents of the state remedy is right to apply to the Supreme Court
for certiorari.") ; accord, Holiday v. Maryland, 177 F. 2d 844 (4th Cir. 1949).
2 N. C. GEN. STAT.
3 In
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lower federal courts in all cases to state prisoners petitioning for a
writ of habeas corpus based on denial of due process,0 until the state
remedies had been exhausted, 10 except in cases where no adequate state
remedy was available. Eleven days prior to the passage of this statute
the Court, in Wade v. Mayo," handed down a decision contrary to its
holding in Ex parte Hawk, indicating that a petition for certiorari from
the judgment in the state court would no longer be a prerequisite to
the filing of an application for habeas corpus in the federal district
court.1 2 But recently in Darrv. Burford,3 the Court, when faced with
the new statute for the first time, interpreted it as requiring an application for certiorari to the Supreme Court before a prisoner may petition
a lower federal court, 1 4 except in cases of "exceptional circumstances."' 5
Although Wade v. Mayo was not overruled, the majority opinion made
it clear that any deviation in the Wade case from the now established
rule was to be abandoned.
Thus it seems that a state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus
in the federal courts, must first petition the Supreme Court for a writ
of certiorari. 5' But where does the prisoner stand when the Supreme
928 U. S. C. C. S. 1684 (1948) ; see Parker, supra note 7, at 178 (".... there
should be no more cases where proceedings of state courts, affirmed by the highest
courts of the state, with denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United
States, will be reviewed by federal circuit or district judges.").
10 62 STAT. 967 (1948), 28 U. S. C. §2254 (Supp. 1949) provides that a prisoner
"shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of
the State . . . if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any
available procedure, the question presented."
11334 U. S. 672 (1948).
("Where it is apparent or even
12 Wade v. Mayo, 334 U. S. 672, 681 (1948)
possible that such [denial] would be the disposition of a petition for certiorari
from the state court's judgment, failure to file a petition should not prejudice the
right to file a habeas corpus application in a district court.") ; accord, Miller v.
Hudspeth, 176 F. 2d 111 (10th Cir. 1949) (The court here says that an analysis
of Wade v. Mayo leads to the conclusion that a petition for writ of certiorari to
the Supreme Court is not part of the state remedy and that 28 U. S. C. §2254 does
a different decision.).
not 12contain
(1950).would require
Ct. 587 which
70 Sup.anything
(1950). The court says that it is
594
Ct.
587,
70
Sup.
v.
Burford,
1, Darr
immaterial as a matter of terminology whether review in the Supreme Court is
considered a part of the state judicial process or a part of the federal procedure.
(conviction obtained by false
1' See White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760 (1945)
testimony, and prisoner denied assistance of counsel); Chambers v. Florida, 309
U. S. 227 (1940) (confession obtained by coercion); Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U. S. 278 (1936) (confession obtained by coercion and brutality); Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U. S.86 (1923) (trial conducted under influence of mob violence) ;
Sharpe v. Kentucky, 135 F. 2d 974 (6th Cir. 1943) (death sentence had been
imposed) ; Murphy v. Murphy, 108 F. 2d 861 (2nd Cir. 1940) (Court says, "'Exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency' alone can justify intervention" of a
federal district court.) ; but cf. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309 (1915) .(trial
conducted under influence of mob violence, but second trial conducted under different conditions and circumstances).
" Of course the prisoner may appeal as a matter of right where the question
involves the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States and the decision
is against its validity, or where the question involves the validity of a state statute
on the grounds that it is repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States and the decision is in favor of its validity. 62 STAT. 929 (1948), 28
U. S. C. §1257 (Supp. 1949).
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Court denies his writ? In Darrv. Burford the court refused to answer
this question. 16
It is universally recognized that res judicata does not apply to applications for writs of habeas corpus ;17 yet, upon filing a petition in the
district court for a writ of habeas corpus the record undoubtedly will
reveal the prior denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court, and the
district court might well refuse to entertain the petition in the absence
of a new basis for relief. Should the petitioner find additional grounds
for his claim, it would then be mandatory that he start over in the
state courts, for he would not have exhausted his state remedies.,, This
procedural circle would therefore in effect, negative the habeas corpus
jurisdiction which the federal courts have had since 1867,10 and leave
the prisoner in somewhat of a dilemma.
The argument favoring inclusion of a petition for a writ of certiorari
from the final state judgment in the "state remedy" is based on the
preservation and amelioration of the doctrine of comity, which, as between the state and federal courts, has become "'a principle of right
and of law."'20 Those who would abolish certiorari as part of the "state
remedy," including the dissenters in Darr v. Burford, contend that the
final result of a denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court must be one
of two unsatisfactory alternatives: either (1) the Supreme Court must
consider the case as if it had granted the request for certiorari, and its
decision be based on the merits of the case; or (2) the denial, as in
other cases, would have no legal significance. 2 ' It is readily apparent
that under the first alternative the work load of the Supreme Court
would become so burdensome that this alone makes such a procedure
prohibitive. 22 Whereas, under the second alternative the result would
"0TDarr v. Burford, 70 Sup. Ct. 587, 595 (1950).

" Darr v. Burford, 70 Sup. Ct 587 (1950) ; Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U. S. 224
(1923) ; Rosso v. Aderhold, 67 F. 2d 315 (5th Cir. 1933) ; Carter v. McClaughry,

105 F. 614 (C. C. D. Ka. 1900).
"'Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 163 F. 2d 498 (4th Cir. 1947), Note, 26 N. C. L.
REV.217 (1948).
"914 STAT. 385 c. XXVIII (1867), now incorporated into 62 STAT. 964 (1948),
28 U. S. C. §2241 (Supp. 1949), as amended, 63 STAT. 105 (1949), 28 U. S. C.
§2241 (Supp. 1950).
2 See Covell v. Heyman, 111 U. S.176, 182 (1884).
21 Darr v. Burford, 70 Sup. Ct. 587, 607 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
" See Parker, supra note 7, at 172. "Statistics compiled by the Administrative

Office of the United States Courts show that in the years 1943, 1944, and 1945,
there were filed in the lower federal courts 1556 petitions by federal prisoners
and 1570 by state prisoners." 18 U. S. L. WEEic 3019 (July 5, 1949) and 3345
(June 20, 1950) gives the following statistical summary of the Supreme Court's
work, for the period 1946-1949:

October Term

1946

1947

1948

1949

Total cases
Cases disposed of

1524
1366

891
772

903
748

880
757

Cases remaining

158

119

155

123
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seem to amount to an unnecessary procedural delay caused by an absurd
prerequisite.
Yet, perhaps it is best that the Supreme Court be given the opportunity in every case to review the record on these important questions
of due process which so often involve fundamental rights. But, since a
denial of certiorari simply means that fewer than four members of the
court deemed it desirable to review a decision of a lower court, and in
no way is an adjudication on the merits, 23 the discretionary power of
the lower federal courts to entertain petitions for writs of habeas corpus
should not be disturbed. By keeping the doors of the lower federal
courts open the chances of injustice are thereby reduced to a minimum.
Therefore, if a state prisoner believes his case still has merit after
certiorari has been denied, he should not hestitate to petition the lower
federal courts for a writ of habeas corpus. But, if in the meantime, new
evidence has been 'discovered, then it would be advisable for him to first
seek a determination of24the question in the state court as suggested in
Stonebreaker v. Smyth.
Thus, it would seem, that if this procedure is left open for a state
prisoner to follow, not only will the doctrine of comity be promoted,
but also the benefits of the "great writ" will be preserved.
WILLIAm L. MILLS, JR.

Limitation of Actions-Effect of Part Payment of Principal
or Interest on Non-Paying Obligor
In North Carolina a part payment by one of a number jointly or
jointly and severally bound, will start the statute of limitations running
anew as to all others of the same class, 1 but if the payment is made
after the remedy is barred it will not bind those not making the pay2Agoston v. Pennsylvania, 71 Sup. Ct. 9 (1950); Maryland v. Baltimore
Radio Show, 338 U. S. 912, 917 (1950) (denial of certiorari means "that fewer
than four members of the Court deemed it desirable to review a decision of the
lower court as a matter 'of sound judicial discretion.' . . . The court has said
this /again, and again; again and again the admonition has to be repeated.").
24163 F. 2d 498 (4th Cir. 1947).
'Davis v. Alexander, 207 N. C. 417, 177 S. E. 417 (1934) (payment by

maker); Dillard v. Farmer's Mercantile Co., 190 N. C. 225, 129 S. E. 598 (1925)

(part payment by maker); Barber v. Absher Co., 175 N. C. 602, 96 S. E. 43
(1918) (part payment by maker); Houser v. Fayssoux, 168 N. C. 1, 83 S. E. 692
(1914) (part payment by principal) ; Garrett v. Reeves, 125 N. C. 529, 34 S. E.
636 (1899) (part payment by principal) ; Copeland v. Collins, 122 N. C. 619, 30
S. E. 315 (1898) (part payment by maker); Le Duc v. Butler, 112 N. C. 458,
17 S. E. 428 (1893) ; Moore v. Beaman, 111 N. C. 328, 16 S. E. 177 (1892) (part
payment by one obligor); Moore v. Goodwin, 109 N. C. 218, 13 S.E. 772 (1891)
(part payment by principal) ; Green v. Greensboro College, 83 N. C. 449 (1880)
(payment of interest by principal). See also MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRAcTICE AND PaOCEDURE §134 (1929).
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ment.2 The same rule applies to sureties on a promissory note or bond,
since, as between the maker and the surety, and as between co-sureties,
there is said to be a community of interest and a common obligation,
and a part payment by either maker or surety before the statute has
run will toll the statute as to the others not making the payment.3 The
reasoning of the court seems to be that the surety is primarily liable
along with the maker of the instrument and is, therefore, included
within the rule applicable to joint makers. 4
One exception to the rule that a part payment by the maker will
bind the surety is the liability of a surety on a guardian's bond. The
court has held that the liability of such a surety is a conditional liability
and secondary, dependent upon the failure of the guardian to pay the
damages caused by his breach. The payment of principal or interest
renews the obligation of the guardian on the amount due his ward and
sets the statute running over as to the guardian but not as to the
surety. 5 The reason for the exception is not clear, since the liability
of any surety is dependent upon the principal's failure to pay.
In an early decision it was held that a payment by a principal before
the statute had run operated as a renewal as to indorsers," but this is
no longer the rule as to indorsers of a promissory note or bond. The
court has since held that the maker of a note and an indorser are not
in the same class, and a payment by the maker before the statute has
run will not start the statute running anew as to accommodation in' Davis v. Alexander, 207 N. C. 417, 177 S. E. 417
Mercantile Co., 190 N. C. 225, 129 S. E. 598 (1925).
§1-27 (1943).
' Dillard v. Farmer's Mercantile Co., 190 N. C.
(signatures appeared on the back of the note, but the

(1934) ; Dillard v. Farmer's
See also N. C. GEN. STAT.
225, 129 S. E. 598 (1925)
court found that the signers

intended to be bound as sureties). A part payment by the surety binds the principal. Copeland v. Collins, 122 N. C. 618, 30 S. E. 315 (1898).

'A surety is an original maker, and becomes primarily and absolutely liable,

as much so as the maker.. . ." Rouse v. Wooten, 140 N. C. 557, 560, 53S.E.
430, 432 (1906). See also Tar Heel Bond Co. v. Krider, 218 N. C. 361, 11 S. E.
2d 291 (1940); Dry v. Reynolds, 205 N. C. 571, 172 S. E. 351 (1933); Wachovia
Bank and Trust Co. v. Clifton, 203 N. C. 483, 166 S. E. 334 (1932) ; Broadway
Bank v. Noble, 203 N. C. 300, 165 S. E. 722 (1932); Raleigh Bank and Trust Co.
v. York, 199 N. C. 624, 155 S. E. 263 (1930) ; Barber v. Absher Co., 175 N. C.
602, 96 S. E. 43 (1918) ; Roberson-Ruffin Co. v. Spain, 173 N. C. 23, 91 S. E. 361
(1917).
'Finn v. Fountain, 205 N. C. 217, 171 S. E. 85 (1933). See also Copley v.
Scarlet, 214 N. C. 31, 197 S. E. 623 (1938).
An action must be brought against the surety on a guardian's bond within
three years after the breach thereof. N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-52(6) (1943).
There seem to be no North Carolina cases on part payment of principal or
interest of executor's, administrator's or collector's bonds, but it is suggested that
the same rule should apply to sureties on these bonds since the language of the
statute providing for a guardian's bond, N. C. GEN. STAT. §33-13 (1943), and of
the statute providing for executor's, administrator's and collector's bonds, N. C.
GEN. STAT. §28-34 (1943), is practically identical and since N. C. GEN. STAT.
§1-52(6) (1943) applies to sureties of executors, administrators, collectors and
guardians.
. Garrett v. Reeves. 125 N. C. 529, 34 S. E. 636 (1899).
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dorsers7 or payee indorsers,8 since they are secondarily liable and in a
different class. The same rule applies to a drawer when a drawee has
made a payment on the bill. The drawee and the drawer are in a
different class since the "drawer's liability is a conditional liability,
-dependent upon presentation to the drawee and notice of his failure
[to honor] to the drawer."O
There seems to be one exception to the rule that a payment by the
maker will not stop the running of the statute as to indorsers. Where
there is an agreement that the parties remain bound notwithstanding
an extension of time granted the maker and there were payments of
interest, by the maker, the statute does not begin to run in favor of
indorsers until the maturity date under the last extension agreement.10
The rule that a part payment by the maker will not stop the running of the statute as to indorsers applies to guarantors. The court has
held that a guarantor and a maker are not in the same class since the
contract of guaranty is collateral to the main debt and a payment by the
maker is a payment on the note, evidencing the principal debt, and
not upon the contract of guaranty which determines the liability of
11
guarantors.
In regard to instruments under seal, the ten year statute of limitations applies as against the principal thereto. 12 The court has held
"Barber v. Absher Co., 175 N. C. 602, 96 S. E. 43 (1918); Houser v.
Fayssoux, 168 N. C. 1, 83 S. E. 692 (1914).
'Le Duc v. Butler, 112 N. C. 458, 17 S.E. 428 (1893).
' "To give this effect [payment by one binds all in the same class] to the act
of one, there must be a community of interest and a common obligation among
them. They must be obligors on a bond, makers of a promissory note, drawers
or acceptors of a bill, or joint indorsers of either. Thus if one of several joint
acceptors promises to pay as directed in the statute, or makes a payment, his
associate acceptors are bound by what he does; but the drawers are not because
there is no such common interest and responsibility as gives legal force to the
act." Wood v. Barber, 90 N. C. 76, 80 (1883).
10 Nance v. Hulin, 192 N. C. 665, 135 S. E. 774 (1926). See also The Fidelity
Bank v. Hessee, 207 N. C. 71, 175 S.E. 826 (1934).
To make indorsers sureties, appropriate words must appear upon the instrument itself or in some writing attached thereto. A resolution passed by a board
of directors which stated that as between the maker and the indorsers all would
be jointly and severally liable for the payment of the note was held not to be
sufficient to make indorsers primarily liable along with the maker. Waddell v.
Hood, 207 N. C. 250, 176 S.E. 558 (1934). See also Meyers Co. v. Battle, 170
N. C. 168, 86 S.E. 1034 (1915); Houser v. Fayssoux, 168 N. C. 1, 83 S. E. 692
(1914) ; Perry v. Taylor, 148 N. C. 362, 62 S.E. 423 (1908).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §25-69 (1943) provides that a person placing his signature
upon an instrument, othervise than a maker, drawer, or acceptor, is deemed to be
an indorser, unless he clearly indicates by appropriate words his intention to be
bound in some other capacity. Appropriate words must appear upon the instrument itself or in some writing attached thereto. Waddell v. Hood, 207 N. C.
250, 176 S. E. 558 (1934). Of course, this does not prevent an indorser from
showing that his indorsement was an accommodation indorsement or from showing
that the relation of indorsers as between themselves for purposes of contribution.
Gillam v. Walker, 189 N. C. 189, 126 S.E. 424 (1925).
" Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Clifton, 203 N. C. 483, 166 S. E. 334
(1930).
See also cases cited in footnote 4.
' 2 N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-47(2) (1943).
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that this statute does not apply to a surety on a sealed instrument,
even though his seal is affixed,1 3 since the use of the word "principal"
and the omission of the word "surety" clearly indicates this to be the
legislative intention,'1 4 therefore, the three year period applies to a
surety. This raises the problem whether or not a principal and a surety
are in the same class, and if they are, will a payment by the principal
bind the surety. If a payment is made before the three year limitation
period has run in favor of the surety, such payment will bind the
surety."5' This rule is applied without discussing whether the principal
and the surety, in this situation, are in the same class. It would seem
that they are not, since the limitation period is different as to each. In
one case, payments made by the principal after the three year statute
had run in favor of the surety did not revive the statute as to the
surety, although the remedy was not barred as against the principalthe ten year statute being applicable to him. 6 It should be pointed out
that as to a guaranty under seal, the contract of a guarantor is his own
separate contract and he is, therefore, a principal to the guaranty-a
sealed instrument-and this being a separate contract under seal, the
suit against the guarantor is not barred until ten years after the cause
of action accrued. 1 7 The problems which arise when there is a surety
on a sealed instruments do not arise when the guaranty is under seal,
since a payment by the principal will not stop the running of the statute
as to guarantors.
The North Carolina rule follows the old English rule that a payment of principal or interest by one of two or more joint or joint and
several debtors will make a new running point for the statute as to all
The only apparent difference is that the English
the other debtors.'
rule was based upon the theory that a payment by one was a payment
for all, the one acting as agent for the others, while the North Carolina
rule is based on the theory that there is a community of interest and a
"=Barnes v. Crawford, 201 N. C. 434, 160 S. E. 464 (1931); Redmond v.
Pippen, 113 N. C. 90, 18 S. E. 50 (1893).

The three-year statute of limitations applies to accommodation indorsers even

though their signatures are under seal. Howard v. White, 215 N. C. 130, 1 S. E.
2d 356 (1939).

"4Barnes v. Crawford, 210 N. C. 434, 160 S. E. 494 (1931).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-52(1) (1943) is applicable to sureties and an action
against them is limited to three years.
" Davis v. Alexander, 207 N. C. 417, 177 S. E. 417 (1934) ; Redmond v. Pippen,

113 N. C. 90, 18 S. E. 50 (1893).

"Davis v. Alexander, 207 N. C. 417, 177 S. E. 417 (1934).

1

If a person whose signature appears on the face of a sealed instrument is sued
as principal thereto, as between the payee and the signers, he may prove by parol
evidence that to the knowledge of the payee he signed the instrument as surety
and not as maker and as to him the three-year statute applies. Davis v. Alexander,
supra.
7 Coleman v. Fuller, 105 N. C. 328, 11 S. E. 175 (1890).
8
2 Whitcomb v. Whiting, 2 Doug. K. B. 652, 99 Eng. Reprint 413 (1781).
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common obligation among them.10 The English courts seem to have
recognized the hardship of the rule and applied it with considerable
reluctance, 20 until it was abolished by statute in 1856.21
The majority of American jurisdictions have repudiated the old
English rule, without the aid of statutes, and hold that a part payment
of principal or interest by one of two or more joint or joint and several
debtors sets the statute running anew only as to the person making the
payment.22 Some states have statutes expressly providing that one joint
debtor shall not lose the benefit of the statute of limitations by reason
of a part payment by a co-obligor.2 A few states still apply the old
English rule. 24 Most of the courts of this country, before abolishing
the rule entirely, made a distinction between cases where the statute
had fully run and where it had partially run.2 5 North Carolina, by
statute, has preserved this distinction. The statute provides that no
act, admission, or acknowledgment by one of the makers of a promissory note or bond after the statute has barred the same, is evidence to
repel the statute except as against the maker doing the act or making
the admission.2 6
It is hard to understand how, in any case, the unauthorized payment
by one party, though he be jointly or jointly and severally bound, can
1" Dillard v. Farmer's Mercantile Co., 190 N. C. 225, 129 S. E. 598 (1925);
Wood v. Barber, 90 N. C. 76 (1883).

" Atkins v. Tredgold, 2 Barn. & C. 23, 107 Eng. Reprint 291 (1823) ; Brandran
v. Wharton, 1 Barn. & Aid. 463, 106 Eng. Reprint 170 (1818).
MERCANTILE LAW AMENDMENT ACT, 19 & 20 Victoria, c. 97, §14 (1856).
' Mohas v. Kasiska, 47 Idaho 179, 276 Pac. 315 (1929)
(the court had before it a statute similar to N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-26 (1943); held, payment of

interest or principal is equivalent to a new promise in writing duly signed and
the written promise binds only the person signing it, therefore payment necessarily
binds only the person who makes it); Northwest Thresher Co. v. Dahltorp, 104
Minn. 130, 116 N. W. 106 (1908) (guarantors, sureties, joint makers); Monidah
Trust Co. v. Kemper, 44 Mont. 1, 118 Pac. 811 (1911) (joint obligors, joint and
several obligors, sureties; held, the effect of part payment is no greater than a
written acknowledgment and a written acknowledgment could only bind the party
making it) ; Hall v. Rogers, 113 Neb. 290, 202 N. W. 908 (1925) (surety, joint
obligors) ; White v. Pittsburgh Vein Coal Co., 266 Pa. 145, 109 Atl. 873 (1920)
(joint debtors); Peoples Bank v. Hastings, 263 Pa. 260, 106 AtI. 308 (1919)
(surety) ; Butts v. Georgetown Mutual Bldg., 142 S. C. 353, 140 S. E. 700 (1927)
(joint debtors).
22 COLO. STAT. c. 102, §§25, 26 (1935); ME. REV. STAT. c. 99, §108 (1944);
MASS. ANNO. LAWS c. 260, §§14, 15 (1933); MIcHr. STAT. ANNO. c. 27, §§617,
618 (1935) ; VT. STAT. c. 82, §§1708, 1709 (1947).
2" Meisner v. Pattee, 170 Ark. 217, 279 S. W. 787 (1926)
(payment of interest by joint maker); Hunter v. Robertson, 30 Ga. 479 (1860); Hooper v.
Hooper, 81 Md. 155, 31 At. 508 (1895) (joint makers) ; Highland Invest. Co. v.
Kansas City Computing Scales Co., 277 Mo. 365, 209 S. W. 895 (1919) (payment
of interest by principal) ; Smith v. Dowden, 92 N. J. L. 317, 105 Atl. 720 (1919) ;
Mason v. Kilcourse, 71 N. J. L. 472, 59 AtI. 21 (1904) ; Ford v. Schall, 110 Ore.
21, 221 Pac. 1052 (1924) (payment of interest by joint maker); Woonsocket
Institution for Savings v. Ballou, 16 R. I. 351, 16 At. 144 (1888) (payment by
maker).
51 WILISTON ON CONTRACrS §193 (1936).
28
N. C. GN. STAT. §1-27 (1943).
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be admitted to enlarge or extend the obligation of another jointly or
jointly and severally bound. Logically and upon principle there can be
but one answer. No such authorization or agency exists, or can be
implied, from the joint contract as will authorize one to act for and
bind the others so as to renew or extend their liability, where the relationship is merely that of joint debtors. If resort were had to principle

instead of precedent it is difficult to see how the unauthorized payment
2
by one could bind his co-debtorY.
It also appears that there is no

practical reason why a part piyment by the principal should toll the
statute as to a surety but not as to a guarantor, since both the surety
and the guarantor, in the real sense, serve the same purpose-to secure
the debt of the debtor. Since N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-27 (1943) is piece-

meal legislation, it is suggested that the statute be amended to provide
that a payment by a party to an obligation, whether payment be made
before or after the statute of limitations has barred the obligation, shall
set the statute running over again only as to the party making the
payment.
PERRY C. HENSON.
Pleadings-General Allegation of Negligence
Until recently it was a settled rule in North Carolina that a general
allegation that -defendant was negligent was an insufficient pleading of
the facts which constituted plaintiff's cause of action,' and as such was
subject to demurrer. 2 This rule underwent a change in the recent case
of Davis v. Rhodes,3 a negligent wrongful death action. There the
questioned allegation was "that defendant unlawfully, recklessly and
negligently struck and collided" with the motor scooter on which the
intestate was riding. This general allegation was held sufficient.
This change was discussed in a recent note, 4 where it was pointed
-' Campbell v. Brown, 86 N. C. 376 (1882).
'Whitehead v. Carolina Telephone & Telegraph Co., 190 N. C. 197, 129 S. E.
602 (1925) (plaintiff used phone to report fire but could not secure connections;
an allegation that defendant was negligent in not responding to his call was held
insufficient); Thomason v. Durham & Northern R. R., 142 N. C. 318, 55 S. E.
205 (1906) (allegation that plaintiff suffered damage "from smoke, noise, odors
and vibrations resulting from operation of defendant's railroad"; held, no cause of
action stated); Conley v. Richmond & Danville Ry., 109 N. C. 69Z 14 S. E. 303
(1891)
(averment stated that intestate was killed and slain by the negligence
of defendant; held too general) ; cf. Lanier v. Roper Lumber Co., 177 N. C. 200,
98 S. E. 593 (1919) (plaintiff alleged that he was "induced to sign a deed by
fraud"; held, insufficient); Citizens Bank v. Cahagan, 210 N. C. 464, 187 S. E.
580 (1936) (allegation that a certain sum was then due and owing held insufficient).
2 "The defendant may demur to the complaint when it appears upon the face
thereof that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action." N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-127 (1943).
S231 N. C. 71, 56 S. E. 2d 43 (1949).
'29 N. C. L. RLy. 89 (1950).
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out that perhaps the change was not too drastic, concluding that in the
future the court would possibly hold general allegations sufficient only
in negligence actions, and might further restrict such general pleading
to negligence actions involving wrongful death. Thus, future pleaders
of negligence actions, not involving wrongful death, were left in doubt
as to whether a cause of action could be stated by alleging negligence
generally. Following the Davis decision, the court could have further
liberalized its requirements so as to attain that -degree of conciseness
allowed by the federal courts.5
However, in Fleming v. Carolina Power & Light Co.,8 the court
did not see fit to so liberalize; instead it reverted to the old rule that a
general allegation is insufficient. 7 In this case, the plaintiff owned a
warehouse to which defendant supplied electric current. During a storm
some of the electric wires outside the warehouse broke; there were
red hot wires going into the structure, and flashing wires dangling
loose. Suddenly, plaintiff's warehouse burst into flames from a fire of
unknown origin starting on the inside of the structure.8 Action was
brought on two theories of negligence; first, a very particularized allegation that the defendant was negligent in not shutting off the current,
and, second, a general allegation "that defendant negligently permitted
electric current in such volume as to set fire to plaintiff's warehouse to
pass through its wires." At the trial, plaintiff proceeded only with
respect to the first theory and did not introduce evidence to substantiate
the second theory. The trial judge refused to charge the jury on the
second theory.0 After a verdict was rendered for defendant on the
first theory, plaintiff appealed, contending the judge erred in refusing
to charge the jury on the second.10
I "A pleading ... shall contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to recover." 28 U. S. C. §& (1950). This allows an
allegation of negligence to take on this form: ". . . defendant negligently drove
a motor vehicle against the plaintiff" who was thereby injured. FED. R. CIv. P.,
form 9.
'232 N. C. 457, 61 S. E. 2d 364 (1950).
"A complaint must contain a plain and concise statement of the facts constituting a cause of action.' N. C. GEN'r. STAr. §1-122 (1943).
' It seems the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur might apply to these facts. See,
McAllister v. Pryor, 187 N. C. 832, 123 S. E. 177 (1922) ; Turner v. Southern
Power Co., 154 N. C. 131, 69 S. E. 767 (1910). However, plaintiff could not
successfully invoke this doctrine here because he could not show that the fire
originated from electricity. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not lie where
more than one inference can be drawn as to the cause of the injury. See, Corum
v. R J. Reynold's Tobacco Co., 205 N. C. 213, 171 S.E. 78 (1933) ; Springs v.
Doll, 197 N. C. 240, 148 S.E. 251 (1929).
'"Where there is any evidence to support a plaintiff's claim it is the duty of
the judge to submit the question to the jury, who are the judges of its weight."
Wittkowsky & Ritch v. Wasson, 71 N. C. 451, 454 (1874).
"It is not enough to say that there was some evidence, a mere scintilla, for
there must be evidence on which the jury might reasonably conclude that there
was negligence. Smith v. Duke University, 219 N. C. 628, 14 S. E. 2d 643
(1941) ; Jones v. Bagwell, 207 N. C. 378, 177 S.E. 170 (1934).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

The court affirmed for two reasons; that the allegation did not
specify wherein the negligence consisted, 1 and, as plaintiff had offered
no proof to substantiate the allegation, he could not proffer an efficacious
appeal because "an appeal ex necessitate follows the theory of the
trial. 1 2

Hence, plaintiff had no basis for an appeal."3

This latter reason alone would be sufficient to defeat plaintiff, and
the reason that the allegation is too general was not necessary, yet, it
was powerfully stated. Consequently, it seems probable that the court
inserted it to serve notice on future pleaders that a general allegation
3f negligence is an insufficient pleading of a cause of action.
In the future, the Davis case will probably be limited to its facts
and North Carolina will probably require specific allegations of negligence. It should be noted, however, that the Fleming case made no
mention of the Davis case, and the latter was decided on demurrer
while the former was not. Even so, cautious pleaders of negligence
should make specific allegations of the manner in which the defendant
was negligent.
RicHAD L. GriFFin.
Pleadings-Overruling of Demurrer for Misjoinder of Parties
and Causes--Effect of Reversal on Appeal
The question was recently presented' as to whether an action was
still pending after the North Carolina Supreme Court had reversed the
lower court's judgment 2 overruling a demurrer for misjoinder of parties
and causes of action.3
After the first opinion was certified down, but before the lower
court had acted in accordance therewith,4 plaintiffs moved for leave to
file an amended complaint. 5 When the motion came before him, the
resident judge concluded that the Supreme Court had sustained the
"1The complaint did set out a cause of action on another theory of negligence.
"Fleming v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 232 N. C. 457, 463, 61 S. E. 2d
364, 3369
(1950).
Coral
Gables, Inc. v. Ayres, 208 N. C. 426, 181 S. E. 263 (1935) ; Edgerton
v. Perkins, 200 N. C. 650, 158 S. E. 197 (1931).
1
Teague v. Siler City Oil Co., 232 N. C.469, 61 S. E. 2d 345 (1950).
' Teague v. Sler City Oil Co., 232 N. C. 65, 59 S. E.2d 2 (1950).
1N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-123 (1943) determines what causes of action may be
joined. For a thorough discussion of joinder of parties and causes, see Brandis,
Permissive Joinder of Parties and Causes in North Carolina, 25 N. C. L. REV. 1,
16 ( 1946).
1See MCINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CML CASES
§694 (1929) for the disposition of a case on appeal.

1N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-163 (1943) allows amendments in the discretion of the
court. N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-131 (1943) which gives the right to move for leave

to amend when a demurrer is sustained, has no application to cases in which the

action has been dismissed for misjoinder of parties and causes. Grady v. Warren,
202 N. C. 638, 163 S.E. 679 (1932).
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diemurrer and that this had the legal effect of dismissing the action.
Hence he denied the motion for want of authority. 6 The basis of the
decision appealed from seems to lie in the often repeated rule that a
demurrer must be sustained and the action dismissed when there is a
misjoinder of parties and causes. 7 There can be no division of the
action to eliminate the misjoinder, and after the demurrer has been
sustained and the action dismissed, an amendment will not be allowed.9
On appeal from the refusal to hear the motion, the Supreme Court,
while recognizing the dismissal rule, stated that the effect of its order
reversing the judgment of the lower court overruling the demurrer was
not to sustain the demurrer, but was an order to the lower court to
do so. As the order did not expressly dismiss the action, it was pending and open to motion until the lower court rendered final judgment.
The Supreme Court has the discretion to enter final judgment or to
allow the lower court to do so upon receipt of its opinion.1 0 In previous
cases where the appeal was from an order overruling a demurrer for
misjoinder of parties and causes, the Supreme Court has rarely dismissed the action upon reversing. 1' Likewise, it has not often expressly
6 No appeal lies to the Supreme Court from the exercise of a discretionary
power of the superior court in the absence of palpable abuse. But if the exercise
of its discretion is refused upon the ground that it has no power to grant a
motion addressed to its discretion the ruling of that court is reviewable. Hooper
v. Glenn, 230 N. C. 571, 53 S. E. 2d 843 (1949) ; Gilchrist v. Kitchen, 86 N. C.
20 (1882).
Beam v. Wright, 222 N. C. 174, 22 S. E. 2d 270 (1942); Wingler v. Miller,
221 N. C. 137, 19 S. E. 2d 247 (1942); Burleson v. Burleson, 217 N. C. 336, 7
S. E. 2d 706 (1940) ; Smith v. Land Bank, 213 N. C. 343, 196 S. E. 481 (1938) ;
Town of Wilkesboro v. Jordon, 212 N. C. 197, 193 S. E. 155 (1937); Atkins v.
Steed, 208 N. C. 245, 179 S. E. 889 (1935); Carswell v. Whisenant, 203 N. C.
624, 166 S. E. 793 (1932); Sasser v. Bullard, 199 N. C. 562, 155 S. E. 248
(1930) ; Citizens Nat. Bank of Baltimore v. Angelo Brothers, 193 N. C. 576, 137
S. E. 705 (1927) ; Rose v. Fremont Warehouse and Improvement Co., 182 N. C.
107, 108 S. E. 389 (1921); Thigpen v. Kinston Cotton Mills, 151 N. C. 97, 65
S. E. 750 (1909); Morton v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 130 N. C. 299, 41
S. E. 484 (1902).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-132 (1943), which provides for division of actions after
a demurrer has been sustained for misjoinder of causes of action, does not apply
when there is also a misjoinder of parties. Moore County v. Burns, 224 N. C.
700, 32 S. E. 2d 225 (1944); Southern Mills, Inc. v. Summit Yarn Co., 223
N. C. 479, 27 S. E. 2d 289 (1943); Rose v. Fremont Warehouse and Improvement Co., 182 N. C. 107, 108 S. E. 389 (1921) ; Roberts v. Utility Mfg. Co., 181
N. C. 204, 106 S. E. 664 (1921) ; Thigpen v. Kinston Cotton Mills, 151 N. C. 97,
65 S. E. 750 (1909); Morton v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 130 N. C. 299,
41 S. E. 484 (1902); State ex rel. Cromartie v. Parker, 121 N. C. 198, 28 S. E.
297 (1897); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 96 N. C. 14, 1 S. E. 648 (1887).
' Grady v. Warren, 202 N. C. 638, 163 S. E. 679 (1932).
" It is not the practice to render final judgment in the Supreme Court unless
it is necessary to protect some right of the litigant parties in danger of ad interim
defeat, or where it is demanded by public convenience or welfare. Ordinarily,
the opinion of the court is certified down to the superior court of the county
from which the appeal came, where a judgment in accordance with the opinion
Mcis entered. Goodson v. Lehmon, 225 N. C. 514, 35 S. E. 2d 623 (1945).
INTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES §694(6)

(1929).

" Southern Mills, Inc. v. Summit Yarn Co., 223 N. C. 479, 27 S. E. 2d 289
(1943); Town of Wilkesboro v. Jordon, 212 N. C. 197, 193 S. E. 155 (1937).
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remanded the action with directions for further proceedings. 12 Ordinarily, upon finding that the lower court erred in not sustaining the
demurrer, it has repeated the dismissal rule and simply reversed, giving
no clear indication whether an amendment to the pleadings could or
could not thereafter be allowed. 13
That the action remains open for motion seems to be a desirable
decision. Plaintiffs are given opportunity to cure a defect which is
otherwise fatal, 14 thus allowing the action to continue, to be decided on
its merits. 15 While -dismissal for "dual misjoinder" is ordinarily without prejudice, and plaintiffs may begin a new action or actions,16 there
is some advantage to plaintiffs in avoiding dismissal. By being allowed
to continue, plaintiffs are able to avoid paying the costs in the original
action, 1 7 and save the time and expense involved in starting a new
action.
The question was raised but was not decided in the present opinion
as to the effect of affirming a judgment which sustained a demurrer for
" dual misjoinder." In such case, authority seems to indicate that the
action is no longer pending and open to motion for leave to amend.,'
If the order which sustained also dismissed, it is clear that no cause
1 Beam v. Wright, 222 N. C. 174, 22 S. E. 2d 270 (1942) ; Shore v. Holt, 185
N. 1'
C.Foot
312, v.
117Davis
S. E.Co.,
165 230
(1923);
Tuck,
84 311
N. C.
605 (1881).
N. C.Street
422, 53v. S.
E. 2d
(1949)
; Moore County v.
Bums, 224 N. C. 700, 32 S. E. 2d 225 (1944); Burleson v. Burleson, 217 N. C.
336, 7 S. E. 2d 706 (1940) ; Smith v. Land Bank, 213 N. C. 343, 196 S. E. 481
(1938); Atkins v. Steed, 208 N. C. 245, 179 S. E. 889 (1935); Williams v.
Gooch, 206 N. C. 330, 173 S. E. 342 (1934) ; Citizens Nat. Bank of Baltimore v.
Angelo Brothers, 193 N. C. 576, 137 S. E. 705 (1927) ; Rogers v. Rogers, 192 N. C.

50, 133 S. E. 184 (1926) ; Roberts v. Utility Mfg. Co., 181 N. C. 204, 106 S. E.
664 (1921); Morton v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 130 N. C. 299, 41 S. E.

484 (1902).

" See note 7 supra.
"It is the policy of the code system to be liberal in allowing amendments to
pleadings so that causes may be tried upon their merits. See Page v. McDonald,
159 N. C. 38, 41, 74 S. E. 642, 643 (1912) ; Cheatham v. Crews, 81 N. C. 343,
345 (1879) ; Bullard v. Johnson, 65 N. C. 436, 438 (1871).
SBurleson v. Burleson, 217 N. C. 336, 7 S. E. 2d 706 (1940); Weaver v.

Kirby, 186 N. C. 387, 119 S. E. 564 (1923). N. C. GEN. STAr. §1-25 (1943),
which allows a new action to be brought within one year after nonsuit, reversal,

or arrest of judgment, if the original suit was commenced within the time prescribed therefor, applies to the new action. Blades v. Southern Ry., 218 N. C.
702, 12 S. E. 2d 553 (1940).
" A new action may be brought under N. C. Gmai. STAT. §1-25 (1943) only
if the costs in the original action have been paid by the plaintiff prior thereto,
unless the original suit was brought in forma pauperis.
" Wingler v. Miller, 221 N. C. 137, 19 S. E. 2d 247 (1942) held that the order
sustaining a demurrer to cross actions for misjoinder of parties and causes worked
a dismissal of the cross actions. It was, therefore, improper to sustain the demurrer and at the same time retain the cross actions for amendment. As pointed
out in the principal case, "the asserted cross actions were not pleadable in that
action so that an amendment could not serve to remedy the defect." Furthermore, an answer rather than a complaint was involved. However, it is doubtful
that these possible distinctions detract from the authority of Wingler v. Miller,

supra, as setting forth a rule of general application. The opinion in the case
clearly dealt with the problem just as if it had been presented by a complaint.
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is pending after the order is affirmed.10 In a few cases, after affirming
a judgment sustaining a demurrer, the court has remanded the case to
allow an amendment. 2 These cases are exceptions to the dismissal
rule.2'
An awkward situation now exists. Assuming that a complaint contains a misjoinder of parties and causes, the principal case holds that
if the lower court overrules a demurrer, and the judgment is reversed
on appeal, plaintiffs have opportunity to move for leave to amend until
the time final judgment is entered in the superior court. But if the
lower court sustains the demurrer and dismisses the action, and the
judgment is affirmed on appeal, plaintiffs have no chance to cure the
defect as no action is pending 2 2 The same result is probable when the
order merely sustains the demurrer. Thus the rights of the parties are
materially affected by the opinion of the trial judge as to what constitutes -a misjoinder of parties and causes. That is, if an appeal is
taken in each case, a proper sustaining of the demurrer is to the advantage of the defendants, while an erroneous order overruling the
demurrer works to the obvious advantage of the plaintiffs. If this
discrepancy is to be regretted, it must be noticed that nothing short
of abrogating the dismissal rule or overruling the present decision is
likely to cure it.
The decision in the present case is a liberal one. In allowing plaintiffs the opportunity to eliminate the objectionable features after the
Supreme Court has found a misjoinder of parties and causes, it is a
recognition that it is feasible to allow severance of the causes, rather than
23
to require dismissal of the action, upon the sustaining of a demurrer.
However, in view of its long standing, it can hardly be said that an
indication has been given that the dismissal rule will be changed.
STEPHEN P. MILLIKIN.
, Grady v. Warren, 202 N. C. 638, 163 S. E. 679 (1932).
"0
Gattis v. Kilgo, 125 N. C. 133, 34 S. E. 246 (1899); Mitchell v. Mitchell,
96 N. C. 14, 1 S. E. 648 (1887); Logan v. Wallis, 76 N. C. 416 (1877). In
Robertson v. Robertson, 215 N. C. 562, 2 S. E. Zd 552 (1939) the court dismissed
only as to the parties causing misjoinder.
" See Brandis, Perissive $oinder of Parties and Cause.0 in North Carolina,
25 N. C. L. REv. 1, 50 (1946).
2 Grady v. Warren, 202 N. C. 638, 163 S. E. 679 (1932).
23 The court has allowed the misjoinder defect to be eliminated after a demurrer was interposed, but before a decision -was made sustaining it. Sparks v.
Sparks, 230 N. C. 715, 55 S. E. 2d 477 (1949); Walker v. Standard Oil Co. of
New Jersey, 222 N. C. 607, 24 S. E. 2d 254 (1943) ; Campbell v. Washington Light

and Power Co., 166 N. C. 488, 82 S. E. 842 (1914).
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Taxation-Depreciation and Inclusion in Equity Invested CapitalAssets Transferred to Attract Industry
Transfers of property and cash from community and civic groups
have become a common method of inducing industry to locate and do
business in areas seeking to progress industrially and commercially.
Even courts adopting a stringent view of these transfers for the purpose
of settling connected taxation questions do not deny the validity and
necessity of supporting them legally. Such transfers benefit both the
transferor, by improving the community financially, and the transferee,
by easing the burden of organization and location expenses.
Recently, in Brown Shoe Company v. Commissioner,1 the United
States Supreme Court clarified its position in regard to tax problems
arising from these transfers. Petitioner, pursuant to the terms of written contracts, had received land, cash, and buildings and equipment
from civic groups in twelve communities, and had agreed to perform
various promises in return, e.g., enlarging existing plants, or building
new ones, and maintaining them at minimum payrolls for a stipulated
numbers of years. Only one transaction, a donation of $10,000 cash
for "organization expenses," was without any contractual basis. In
every instance where cash was involved, the cash received was less than
the outlay required to perform the contract. Two problems were presented by these transfers: First, whether the company could dleduct
depreciation on buildings transferred and on buildings and equipment
acquired or enlarged with cash received; and second, whether the company could include in its equity invested capital credit for purposes
of excess profits taxation the total amount of cash and property contributed.2 The court allowed both the deduction for depreciation and
the inclusion in equity invested capital.
This decision eliminated a trend in the cases which had been a matter
of concern to businessmen and the accounting profession since the decision of Detroit Edison Company v. Commissioner.3 The Detroit
Edison Company had charged its consumers for the cost of extending
170
Sup. Ct. 820 (1950).
2
The 1940 excess profits tax, which had much in common with prior excess
profits taxes, was aimed only at swollen profits which are caused by wartime
conditions. Two bases for applying the tax were provided, after a specific exemption of $5,000. First, the taxpayer could deduct from the net income, subject
to the ordinary income tax, the average of earnings for a given base period. Or it
could take as a credit an amount equal to eight percent of its invested capital.
In other words, Congress evidently considered a return of eight percent on invested capital a fair return under normal business conditions. It is obvious that
if the latter basis is used, it is to the taxpayer's advantage to include as much
as it could in invested capital, since the amount of the tax is in inverse propor-

tion to the size of invested capital. The 1940 tax was repealed in 1945, but in

view of present world conditions that or a similar tax may once again be imposed. RzvxxuE Acr oF 1940, 201, 54 STAT. 975 (1940).

'319 U. S. 98 (1942).
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electric current distribution facilities and claimed as a base for computing its depreciation the full cost of the installations. 4 The Court
decided that the funds were neither a gift nor a contribution to capital,
and the company was denied depreciation on that portion of the cost
which it had shifted to its consumers.
Nothing in the Detroit Edison Company case should alarm a taxpayer who happened to be involved in the kind of transactions which
were under consideration in the Brown Shoe Company case, because
the situations are totally different. The funds received by the Detroit
Edison Company were payments for service which would directly benefit
the one making the payments. In no sense could it be contended that
the purpose of the payments was to enlarge the capital of the company; while this was the desired result of the transactions in the
Brown Shoe Company case. The only benefit to the civic groups was
that which might ultimately arise from the financial betterment of the
community. Only indirectly would there be any form of compensation
for the funds expended. 5
The disconcerting element, before the distinction made by the Court
in the Brown Shoe Company case became binding upon all circuits, was
that the Tax Court had considered itself bound by the Detroit Edison
Company decision in the Brown Shoe Company case,8 in McKay Products Corporationv. Commissioner,7 and in Downey v. Commissioner.8
It disallowed both depreciation and inclusion in invested capital. The
Tax Court was reversed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in the
McKay case,0 but was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
in the Brown Shoe Company case 0 and the Downey case. 1' This conflict was the basis for the Court's granting certiorari in the Brown Shoe
Company case.12 Had the Court chosen to adopt the view of the Eighth
Circuit, an immediate result would have been the diminution in value
of such transfers to the transferee, and possibly to the transferor, who
might finally be forced to make up the difference. However, the Court's
adoption of the view of the Third Circuit has limited the Detroit Edison
Company case to its factual context, and the way is now clear for the
full realization of the value to be derived.
An analysis of the factors and theories involved in these decisions
discloses three major divisions of approaches to the problem of invested
capital. One approach may properly be termed the "purchase" theory.
' INT. Rv. CODE §§113(a) (2), 113(a) (8) (B).
and in McKay Products
' This distinction is utilized in both the principal case
Corporation v. Commissioner, 178 F. 2d 639 (3rd Cir. 1949).
"9 T. C. 1082 (1947).
6 10 T. C. 291 (1948).
'178 F. 2d 639 (3rd Cir. 1949).
8 10 T. C. 837 (1948).
10 175 F. 2d 305 (8th Cir. 1949).
1' 70

Sup. Ct. 820 (1950).

172 F. 2d 810 (8th Cir. 1949).
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Under this theory, the consideration furnished by the company for the
transfer is regarded as payment for the property. Accordingly, the
property could not be considered invested capital, any more than the
general assets could be. This approach overlooks the intent of the
framers of the 1940 Excess Profits Tax Act.1 3 In comparing this
statute with the previous act of 1917,14 it will be noted that the italicized
words were added: "The equity invested capital . . . shall be the sum
of the following amounts, reduced as provided in subsection (b) . . .
(2) . . . Property (other than money) previously paid in (regardless
of the time paid in) for stock, or as paid-in surplus, or as a contribution
to capital."' 5 Congress probably thus indicated an intention to adopt
the view that invested capital was no longer to be confined to funds
received from persons with a proprietary interest in the company, because such funds were already includible as paid-in surplus. 16 In the
Brown Shoe Company case the point is made that such assets are adIditions to "capital" as that term has long been understood in business and
accounting practice. 17
The second approach is the "gift" theory. It is based upon the
concept that the transaction between the transferor and the transferee
is a "gift subject to a condition."' 8 To support this classification it has
been urged that the bargain element is lacking, and that the transferor
is saying, in effect, "Move here, and we will give you valuable property." (Emphasis supplied.)1 While such an interpretation may be
very desirable to a promisor wishing to avoid legal liability, if followed
to its logical conclusion it would have a company spending large sums
to locate and build a plant on the mere chance that it will receive a
"gift" of land or other property, subject to the whim or caprice of the
promisor. While it is useless to argue intent without a given situation,
it will suffice to point out that the usual profitable, desirable business
enterprise could hardly be supposed to have based such a substantial
expenditure of the stockholders' funds on the hazards of a promise
which is legally unenforceable. If the reply is made that the gift is to
occur before the outlay, then it will forever remain in the realm of
speculation as to how this "Alphonse and Gaston" routine will end: one
" REVENUE ACT OF 1940, §201, 54 STAT. 975 (1940).
1, REVENUE Acr OF 1917, §200, 39 STAT. 1000 (1917).
" RnNUE AcT OF 1940, §201, 54 STAT. 975 (1940).
1"

One case where funds contributed by stockholders would be neither money

paid in for stock nor paid-in surplus would arise where stockholders contribute
funds to erase a capital deficit. But in view of the broad language used in adding
to the definition of invested capital in the statute, it can hardly be supposed that

Congress intended so narrowly to restrict the addition. Such restrictive language
could easily have been inserted instead of the inclusive phrase, "contributions to
capital."
"770 Sup. Ct. 820, 823 (1950).
" 27 TAxEs 741, 744 (1949).

27

TAxEs

741 (1949).
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party saying, "After you give, Alphonse"; the other saying, "After you
move, Gaston." It cannot be denied that only two interpretations are
reasonable. Either there is a bilateral contract, with the company
promising to move, build, and maintain the plant for a certain period
at a certain minimum payroll and the civic group promising to convey
the property; or there is a unilateral contract, which came into existence
upon the company's performance of the conditions contained in the
offer, i.e., moving and building. The former has the advantage of
greater probability. The gift theory seems insupportable when examined with regard to the intent of the parties and the rules of- contract
which govern their relations.
The recognition of an enforceable contract between the parties gives
rise to the third theory, which may be called the "contract-cost" theory.
This theory requires the inclusion of the assets in invested capital. It
recognizes the obvious fact that there is "cost" to the taxpayer, in that
there is an expenditure consequent upon performance of that contract.
But the fact that the assets "cost" the taxpayer does not prevent their
being invested capital any more than the issuance of stock keeps the
funds paid in from being so regarded. It is true that the contributor
of the assets may profit, even if only remotely, but so may the purchaser of stock through the increase in value of the stock.
The "contract-cost" theory has the best of the legal logic. It says,
in effect, "Of course there is 'cost' to the taxpayer, but that does not
prevent the assets from being 'contributions to capital,' since the intent
of the parties was that they be such, and since there is no inherent
reason why 'contributions to capital' may not arise from a contract.
The application of this theory is unnecessary to resolve the inclusion
in invested capital of cash or property truly donated, as was one of the
amounts in the Brown Shoe Company case, since there is no problem
of actual cost to the taxpayer. If the premise that "contributions" to
capital may originate from outside the business is conceded, then the
conclusion is inescapable that the term "contribution" includes by its
plain meaning genuine gifts, be they cash or property.
As to depreciation, the irreconcilable decisions of the courts simply
reflect the deeply rooted conflict over the true nature of depreciation.
This conflict transcends legal considerations, and has long been a matter
of controversy among accountants, businessmen, and scholars. The
older school of thought regards 'depreciation's true function as the
charging off of the original investment; in other words, the "return of
the investment." The newer viewpoint is that depreciation allowances
are made to provide for the replacement of the asset, leaving the original
investment as representative of the equity of the original stockholders.
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Fortune, in the guise of an enlightened Congress, has saved the courts
from the necessity of having to adopt either viewpoint as correct. In
providing for a corporation income tax, Congress clearly indicated
that the replacement theory should be used. Only this interpretation
can explain the provisions for a substituted depreciation basis in certain
situations. That is, in cases where depreciation clearly should be
allowed, as in the case of a gift or donation, but no actual cost basis
exists, the donee-taxpayer is allowed to use the basis of the donor,
limited to the fair market value at the time of the transfer. 20 If Congress had intended the older view of depreciation to prevail, the taxpayer would be held to a strict cost basis, and having no cost, would
be denied depreciation in many instances where his right to take it is
undisputed today. In the light of this conclusion, how realistic is the
argument that depreciation should be denied because there is no ascertainable cost to the taxpayer?
No distinction should be made taxwise between property acquired
,lirectly and property purchased with funds acquired. In each instance
the Brown Shoe Company was required to perform certain obligations
concerning the property, thus plainly contemplating that the company
already owned such property, or would purchase it with the funds
acquired, or would receive it by the terms of the contract. Any distinction made merely goes to the form of the transaction, and not to
its substance. If this distinction were permitted to effect a different
treatment from a tax standpoint, the only result would be a change in
the form of all subsequent transactions. Such a result would benefit
neither the government nor the taxpayer.
The Court in the Brown Shoe Company case adopts a liberal attitude
in allowing depreciation on the assets and their inclusion in equity invested capital. The type of transaction involved serves a useful purpose
in community development, and this helpful attitude on the part of the
Court should go far in preserving the value of such transactions for
both the community and the industries which it seeks to attract.
HARPER JOHNSTON ELAM, III.
Taxation-Exempt Organizations-Income Derived from
Unrelated Business
Under §101 of the Internal Revenue Code certain organizations
have been granted exemption from the income tax. These exemptions
remained substantially unchanged from the original Act of 1913,1 until
the Revenue Act of 19502 During the interim an increasing number
2* IxT. Rmv. COD

§113(a) (2).

138 STAT. 166 (1913).
'Pub. L. No. 814, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. §301 (Sept. 23, 1950).
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of organizations engaging in competitive businesses acquired exemption
through judicial expansion of §101. s Due to the resulting injurious
effect on competition additional legislation became desirable 4
The expansion of the exemptions under §101 of the Code was started
by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Trinidad v.
Sagrada Orden de Predicadores5 There it was held that a charitable
organization did not lose its exemption because engaged in selling noncompetitive articles, 6 such sales being incidental to the work of the
organization. The court stated that the destination rather than the
source of the income was the ultimate test of exemption. This principle was later extended to exempt organizations actively engaged in
competitive businesses. 7 In Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner s a
further step was taken when a corporation was held exempt, which did
not itself engage in charitable activities, but which was organized for
the purpose of providing income for a charitable organization.
In order to claim the exemption under the principle of Roche's
Beach the "feeder" organization must have been organized and operated
"exclusively" for one or more of the specific purposes enumerated in
§101 of the Code. Two recent decisions have expressed conflicting
views as to what constitutes organization "exclusively" for an exempt
purpose. In each case the stock of a business corporation was transferred to an exempt organization and the charter amended providing, in
effect, that the corporation would be operated exclusively for charitable
and educational purposes. While both courts recognized the validity of
Roche's Beach, the corporation in Universal Oil Products v. Campbell9
was held not to be exempt as it was not originally organized exclusively
for educational purposes; whereas the corporation in Home Oil Mills v.
Willinghamz 0 was held to be exempt on the theory that there had been
a legal rebirth of the corporation by the amendment to its charter, and
that, therefore, it was organized exclusively for charitable purposes.
Although the Bureau announced in 1942 it would no longer follow
$Finkelstein, Freedom from Uncertainty in Income Tax Exemption, 48 MICE.
L. REV. 449, 453 (1950).
'SEN. REP,. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1950).
5 263 U. S. 578 (1924).
'The organization derived income from the sale of wine, chocolate, and other
articles purchased and supplied for use in its churches, missions, and schools.
Bohemian Gymnastic Ass'n Sokal v. Higgins, 147 F. 2d 774 (2d Cir. 1945)
(operated a bar and restaurant); Sand Springs Home v. Commissioner, 6 B. T. A.
198 (1927) (sold food and oil products) ; Appeal of Unity School of Christianity,
4 B. T. A. 61 (1926) (operated an inn and published books).
'96 F. 2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938) (the corporation operated a beach house).
181 F. 2d 451 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 71 Sup. Ct. 78 (1950) (the court
also found that the corporation was not operated exclusively for educational purposes as the organizers retained the right to use its patents without payment of
royalties).
. 181 F. 2d 9 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 71 Sup. Ct. 80 (1950).
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Roche's Beach," the courts adhered to it.'
Recently, however, in
Mueller Co. v.Commissioner'3 the Tax Court refused to follow Roches
Beach, and thereby narrowed the scope of exemption granted by §101.
Mueller involved facts similar to Universal and Home Oil Mills. New
York University Law School purchased all of the stock of a profitable
business corporation and merged it with a new corporation, the charter
of which stated that it was organized exclusively for educational purposes. It was further specified that all of its income should inure to
the benefit of the Law School. The Court held §101(6) of the Code
exempted only organizations actually and principally engaged in an
activity of the kind mentioned in the Code and did not include a corporation, the principal activity of which was engaging in competitive
commercial business for profit. Thus Mueller represented the first
departure from the apparently settled doctrine of Roche's Beach and
was in conflict with many decisions that had cited the latter, case with
approval. 14
The Internal Revenue Act of 1950, however, settled for the future
the uncertainty brought about by Mueller. A paragraph added to §101
of the Internal Revenue Code states that an organization operated primarily to carry on a trade or business for profit may not claim exemption solely on the ground that all of its profits are payable to one or
more organizations exempt under that section. The underlying reason
for this amendment is that such a business organization is not carrying
out an exempt purpose and is in direct competition with taxable organizations. 15 While the amendment denies a corporation the right to
claim exemption from taxation on the ground that all of its income is
payable to an exempt organization, presumably a subsidiary corporation
of an exempt organization may still claim exemption if its activities
are related to the function for which its parent was granted exemption.
This amendment is only applicable to taxable years beginning after
December 31, 1950. Cases involving a taxable year prior to this date
must be decided without drawing any inference from the amendment. 16
It would seem that if income is to be taxed when earned by a subsidiary of an educational or charitable organization, it should also be
taxed when earned directly by such an organization. In both cases the
ILG. C M. 23063, 1942-1 Cum. BULL. 103.
12 Orton v. Commissioner, 173 F. 2d 483 (6th Cir. 1949); Debs Memorial
Radio Fund v. Commissioner, 148 F. 2d 948 (2d Cir. 1945) (The court said that
it would continue to follow Roche's Beach until instructed to do otherwise by
final authority.) ; Estate of Louise v. Simpson, 2 T. C. 963 (1943).
1214 T. C. (May 25, 1950).
"See
note 10, supra.'
'2 H. R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1950); SEN . REP. No. 2375,

81st Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1950).
1" Pub. L. 814, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. §303 (Sept. 23, 1950)
(Apparently this
provision was intended to avoid a retroactive effect.).
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type of business function is the same and the income used for the same
purposes. If the law were otherwise the business carried on by the
subsidiary could easily be transferred to the parent and thereby escape
taxation. Apparently in an attempt to close any loophole that might
result from such action by an exempt corporation, the Congress amended
Chapter 1, Supplement U of the Internal Revenue Code, in the Revenue
Act of 1950.
Under this amenwdment certain organizations exempt under §101 of
the Code are made subject to the income tax on income from the
operation of business enterprises unrelated to the purpose for which
such an organization received its exemption. 17 Many organizations,
however, now exempt under §101 of the Code are not affected by the
amendment, and the application of the new tax is restricted by numerous
exceptions and limitations.
The new tax applies only to the unrelated business income of labor,
agricultural, and horticultural organizations exempt under §101(1) of
the Code; literary, scientific, religious (other than churches or associations of churches), educational and charitable organizations exempt
under §101(6); the business and trade associations exempt under
§ 101(7) ; and title holding companies exempt under § 101(14) if their
income is payable to section 101 (1), (6), or (7) organizations.18
The act defines unrelated income as income derived from a trade or
business "regularly carried on" and "not substantially related" (aside
from the need of income) to the purpose for which the organization
was granted exemption under §101 of the Code.' 9 Sporadic activities
such as the operation of a sandwich stand during the week of an annual
county fair would not be considered a business regularly carried on.
be considered substantially related
Athletic activities of schools 2would
0
to their educational functions.
The Supplement U tax is not applicable to a business in which all
of the work is performed without compensation; a business carried on,
by an organization exempt under §101(6), for the convenience of its
members, students, patients, or employees; or a business in which all
of the merchandise sold was acquired by the organization as a gift or
2
contribution. 1
Although money received by an exempt organization is within the
definition of unrelated business income it may not be subject to the
27 INT. REv. CODE §421.

'*

INT. REv. CODE §421(b).

" INT. REv. CODE §422.

SEN. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1950).
INT. REV. CODE §422(b). The Senate Finance Committee illustrates the type
of businesses excluded under this section as (1) an exempt orphanage running a
second-hand clothing store by means of volunteer workers, (2) a university laundry operated for the convenience of the students. (3) a thrift shop operated by
an exempt organization. SEN. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1950).
20

2
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Supplement U tax if derived from dividends, interest, annuities, royalties, rents, gains from the sale of property, or research.22 Such income
is not taxable because it is considered to be passive in nature and not
23
to have a harmful effect on competition.
The new law does not deprive an organization of its tax exemption
or require it to dispose of its unrelated business.2 4 The tax is imposed
only on unrelated business income in excess of $1,00025 The related
income of an exempt organization will continue to be exempt as under
26
the old law.
The new tax became effective with taxable years beginning after
December 31, 1950.27 Organizations taxable as corporations will pay
the normal rate of 25 per cent on their unrelated business income and
a surtax of 20 per cent on such income over $25,000 ;2 however, these
rates may be changed by current legislation proposing increases in corporation tax rates and an excess profits tax. Organizations taxable as
trust will be taxed at the same rate as individuals.2 Also of importance
is the fact that the tax is imposed on the net unrelated income in order
that losses on one unrelated venture may be offset against gains on
another 30
RobERT M. WmaLY.
Torts--Malpractice--Liability of Physician for Acts of Substitute
The liability of a physician1 to a patient for malpractice is dependent

upon the existence of a physician-patient relationship, or upon a relationship based on contract. Absent a special contract to the contrary, a
physician-patient relationship is brought into existence upon acceptance
of the patient for treatment, and such relationship may be terminated
by mutual consent, dismissal of the physician by the patient, determination by the physician that his services are no longer needed, or reasonable notice to the patient in order that that patient may have an
2'1T.
2
REv. CODE §422(a). Rents from real property (including personal
property leased with real property) are excluded from the Supplement U Tax.
However, income from a lease of a term of five years or more will be taxed in
the proportion that any unpaid debt on the rented property at the close of the
taxable year bears to the adjusted basis of such property. A gain from the sale
of property is defined as property other than stock in trade or property held for
sale to customers. Research, as used in this section is defined as research performed for the United States or its agencies, or any state or subdivision thereof,
research performed by any university or hospital for any person, and research
done for any person by an organization designed to carry on fundamental research
if the results are made available to the public.
"SE. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1950).
SEN. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1950).
qINT.
REv. CODE §421 (b) (1).
2INT. REv. CODE §421(c).
'8 INT. REv. CODE §421(a)(1).
'IxT. REV. CODE §421(a).
"INT. Rv.CODE §422 (a)(6).
"INT. REv. CODE §421(a) (2).
Reference to physicians throughout this article also includes surgeons.
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opportunity to engage the services of another 2 It has also been held,
though there is little authority on the point, that a physician, who
possesses no peculiar personal qualifications and no special knowledge
of the patient's malady, may discharge his patient by substituting in
his place another physician who possesses a proper amount of skill and
is a duly careful person. 3 This seems tb be the gtneral rule and a
substitution under these circumstances severs the phytician-patient relationship between the first physician and his patient, and thereby
relieves the first physician of liability for the negligence or malpractice
of the substitute. But where the substitution is not made in accordance
with this rule, liability may be incurred by the first physician for the
negligence of the substitute.
This question of liability of a physician for the acts of a substitute4
physician arose in the early North Carolina case of Nash v. Royster.
There, after an operation, the attending physician left town for a period
of two weeks and upon leaving, turned his patient over to the care of
another physician without notice to, or the consent of, the patient. In
an action brought against the first physician for the negligence of the
substitute, the court held that a physician is not liable for the acts of a
substitute physician, unless the substitute acts as his agent in performing the service, or due care is not exercised in selecting the substitute.
The case further held that neither the consent of the patient, nor the
lack of consent, is the determining factor as to whether the relation of
principal and agent existed between the two physicians, but whether
agency in fact had been created was to be determined by the relations
actually existing between the parties under their agreements or acts.
In a leading case on this question, the Texas court declared that the
substitute was in effect an independent contractor, reasoning that the
nature of his work required him to exercise his own judgment ant
skill. 5 A similar result was reached in a New Jersey case,8 where it
was pointed out that no business relation existed between the two.
physicians and emphasis was placed on the distinct and independent
character of the substitute's work.
It has been said that where one desiring to employ another to perform a service in his stead is obliged by law to employ a licensed person
2

Fortner v. Koch, 272 Mich. 273, 261 N. W. 762 (1935); Grove v. Myers,
224 N. C. 165, 29 S. E. 2d 553 (1944) ; Swan, The California Law of Malpractice
of Physicians, Surgeons, and Dentists, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 248 (1945); see Note,
56 A. L. R. 818 (1928).
"Gross v. Robinson, 203 Mo. App. 118, 218 S. W. 927 (1920) ; Myers v. Holburn, 58 N. J. L. 193, 33 Atl. 389 (1895); Nash v. Royster, 189 N. C. 408, 127
S. E. 356 (1925); Lee v. Moore, 162 S. W. 436 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913); see
Notes, 21 R. C. L. 395 (1918); 46 A. L. R. 1154 (1927).
'Nash v. Royster, 189 N. C. 408, 127 S. E. 256 (1925).
'Lee v. Moore, 162 S.W. 436 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
Myers v. Holburn, 58 N. J. L. 193, 33 AtI. 389 (1895).
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(as is the case with physicians), he is not responsible for the negligent,
defective, or improper execution of the work of such person as the
relation of master and servant does not exist
This, however, seems
to be too broad a rule. Although it may indicate, as in any other case
in which skill is involved, that such master and servant relationship is
not contemplated, the relationship may in fact exist. This is true even
though the law requires the selection of persons for the particular work
to be made from a limited class, irrespective of how limited the class
may be. 8 The question of whether agency in fact existed is one for the
jury to determine upon a consideration of the relations actually existing
between the parties under their agreements or acts in the light of local
custom.9
The general rule that a physician must exercise due care in selection
of a substitute was recognized in Nash v. Royster.10 In a Nebraska
case'1 where a physician with thirty years specialized practice turned
his patient over to a substitute physician of only four years experience,
the principal physician was held liable on grounds of abandonment. It
was pointed out by the court that the patient was in fact employing a
specialist, and for the principal physician to substitute another physician
of little experience without notice to or agreement by the patient was a
violation of duty and abandonment of the case. It would seem that
under the rule of Nash v. Royster requiring the exercise of due care in
the selection of a substitute, North Carolina might reach the same result
as the Nebraska case.
12
An analogous problem arises as to the liability of non-charitable
hospitals for the negligence and malpractice of physicians of the hospital.
It seems that here though, a special situation is confronted in which
liability arises out of contract and depends on whether the hospital has
undertaken responsibility for the part of the treatment in which the
Myers v. Holburn, 58 N. J. L. 193, 33 Atl. 389 (1895) ; Woon,

MASTER AND

SERVANT
§311 (1877).
8
RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §223 (1933).

'Nash v. Royster, 189 N. C. 408, 127 S. E. 356 (1925); Tetting v. Hotel
Pfister, 221 Wis. 141, 266 N. W. 249 (1936) (Defendant hotel did not ask to
have submitted to the jury any question of fact with reference to the status of
employment of a masseur, who, while an employee of the hotel, rendered negligent
treatment to a customer; but on appeal contended that as a rule of law a licensed
masseur cannot be a servant because the law requires his selection to be from a
limited class and that such employees are not subject to control as to the details
of their work. Held: That this is not a rule of law which would preclude the
conclusion that a masseur may be a servant or agent.). In determining whether
one acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor, see RESTATEMENT,
AGENCY §220 (1933).
10 See note 4 supra.
't Stohlman v. Davis, 117 Neb. 178, 220 N. W. 247 (1928).
"Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N. C 594, 83 S. E. 807 (1914) (charitable institutions
are exempt from liability under a special doctrine of public policy) ; Note, 19

N. C. L.

Yv. 245 (1941).
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negligence occurred.' 2 Where the hospital admits patients for treatment and the patient chooses his own physician, or where the hospital
only acts as an agency for recommending or employing such physician,
the hospital has been held not liable for the negligence or malpractice
of such physician. But it may be liable for negligence in recommending
or selecting such physician. 14 When the hospital contracts to render a
certain treatment, or to perform a particular operation for a contracted
price, and then undertakes to perform its part of the contract through
its own physician employees, the physicians may be liable for their own
negligence or malpractice, and the hospital may incur liability predicated
upon contract.1 5 Under the same doctrine it has been held that a
company or employer who agrees to furnish medical benefits to its
employees is liable only for the negligent appointment of a physician.' 6
But in some jurisdictions where the employer contracts to furnish medical benefits, and then attempts to furnish such treatment in its own
company hospital or infirmary and through its own company physician
employees, the employer has been held liable on the same basis as hospitals which incur liability by contract.17
While it is true a physician may incur liability by contract, in addition to liability for his own negligence or malpractice, the physicianpatient relationship does not necessarily rest on contract.1 8 , The
physician may render his services gratuitously,' or at the request of
some third person for the benefit of the third person only ;20 but the
physician will still be liable to the patient because of the physicianpatient relationship.2 ' Where there is no specific contract between the
patient and physician to the contrary, the physician does not guarantee
to effect a cure,22 nor is he obliged to stay on the case until his services
See Note, 4 A. L. R. 191 (1919).
a' Robinson v. Cratwell, 175 Ala. 194, 57 So. 23 (1911) ; Smith v. Duke University, 219 N. C. 628, 14 S. E. 2d 643 (1941); Penland v. Hospital, 199 N. C.
314, 154 S. E. 406 (1930) ; Johnson v. Hospital, 196 N. C. 610, 146 S. E. 573
(1929) ; see Note, 22 A. L. R. 346 (1923).
" Brown v. La Socidt6 Francaise, 138 Cal. 475, 71 Pac. 516 (1903) ; Jenkins
v. Charleston Gen. Hospital, 90 W. Va. 230, 110 S. E. 560 (1922) ; see Smith v.
Duke University, 219 N. C. 628, 635, 14 S. E. 2d 643, 648 (1941) ; see Note, 22
13

A. L. R. 346 (1923).
" McMahan v. Spruce Co., 180 N. C. 636, 105 S. E. 439 (1920); Woody v.
Spruce Co., 176 N. C. 643, 97 S. E. 610 (1918); Barden v. R. R., 152 N. C.
318, 67 S. E. 971 (1910).
" Knox v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., 158 F. 2d 973 (5th Cir. 1947); Kain
v. Ariz. Copper Co., 14 Ariz. 566, 133 Pac4 412 (1913) ; see Note, 33 A. L. R.
11938 (1924)..
Thaggard v. Vales, 218 Ala, 603, 119 So. 647 (1928) ; Du Bois v. Decker,
130 N. Y. 325, 29 N. E. 313 (1891) ; People v. Murphey, 101 N. Y. 126, 4 N. E.
326 (1886) ; see Note, 21 R. C. L. 375 (1918).
' Thaggard v. Vafes, 218 Ala. 603, 119 So. 647 (1928); Du Bois v. Decker,
130 N. Y. 325, 29 N. E. 313 (1891).
20 People v. Murphey, 101 N. Y. 126, 4 N. E. 326 (1886).
• See note 19 supra.
22 Davis v. Pittman, 212 N. C. 680, 194 S. E. 97 (1937) ; Pendergraft v. Royster.
203 N. C. 384, 166 S. E. 285 (1932), Note, 19 N. C. L. Rv. 617 (1941).
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are no longer needed. He may release himself, as has been noted, by
giving sufficient notice to the patient to secure the services of another,28
provided of course, he
or by turning the case over to another physician,
24
exercises due care in selecting such substitute.
As a generalization, then, it seems that the prevailing view, with
which North Carolina is apparently in accord, is that a physician or
surgeon can relieve himself of liability for the negligent acts and omissions of a substitute physician or surgeon, provided: (1) he is under
no contract which wpuld create greater liability than that which rises
out of the mere physician and patient relationship, (2) -due care is
exercised in selecting such substitute, (3) by the relations actually
existing among the parties under their agreements or acts, agency between the physicians in fact did not exist.
HUGH P. FORTESCUE, JR.
Torts-Negligence--Intervening Criminal Act
When the deceased entered the defendant's store, the defendant's
fourteen-year-old son pulled a pistol from under the counter and pointed
it at the deceased. Though requested to put it away, he discharged it,
inflicting a fatal wound.
A suit was instituted for the wrongful death against both the defendant and his son. The plaintiff alleged that the 'defendant, who
knew that his son had brandished the pistol at other customers, was
negligent in leaving the pistol where his son could obtain possession of
the dangerous instrumentality. It was further alleged that the son
maliciously shot the deceased and also that the son's act was negligent.
The Georgia court held that the demurrer as to the defendant should
have been sustained since the son's intervening act was criminal and
superseded the defendant's negligence. As to the son, the court said
a cause of action, in negligence, had been stated.,
The statement of the general rule applicable to such cases, that a
subsequent, independent and unforeseeable criminal or negligent act
supersedes the original party's negligence and renders that party not
liable, is followed by the Georgia court. Whether stated in terms of
liability or non-liability for intervening acts, the problem of these cases
is not the statement of the rule but rather the application of the rule
to the facts of a particular case.
The case did not reach a jury, and the holding of the Georgia court
is partially explainable under peculiar local rules of pleading. When a
petition is attacked by demurrer in that state, the facts alleged are taken
2 See note 2
1 Skelton

.supra.

2 See note 3 supra.

v. Gambrell, 80 Ga. App. 880, 57 S. E. 2d 694 (1950).
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as true;2 however, unlike the general rule, the petition is construed
most strongly against the pleader.3 Following these rules, the court
interpreted the petition as alleging that the son's act was malicious and
intentional which would subject the son to criminal prosecution for
murder or manslaughter. 4 Furthermore, Georgia is one of the states
which consistently hold intervening criminal acts unforeseeable, 5 unless.,
the original party had definite knowledge that the intervening party was
of a vicious disposition. 6 The holding in the case under consideration
is not inconsistent with previous decisions of the Georgia courts.
On the facts it seems that the plaintiff should recover; however,
the petition omitted material allegations, e.g., that the deceased was a
owed a duty to provide a
business invitee to whom the defendant
7
reasonably safe place in which to shop.
In an Oregon case, the proprietor of a restaurant was held liable,
on grounds of negligence, when a guest was assaulted by another guest
who was known by the proprietor to create trouble.8 It was so held
even though the intervening act was criminal and the intervening party
had not previously committed a similar crime.P Consequently, it seems
'Readon v. Bland, 206 Ga. 633, 58 S. E. 2d 377 (1950).
Thornton v. Hardin, 205 Ga. 215, 52 S. E. 2d 841 (1949).
'Skelton v. Gambrell, 80 Ga. App. 880, 57 S. E. 2d 694, 697 (1950). "We
think the plaintiffs' allegation that the defendants . . . knew that W. C. Skelton,
Jr., had pointed the pistol at other customers . . . was not sufficient to show
notice on their parts that W. C. Skelton, Jr., would commit the criminal offense
of murder or manslaughter."
IAndrews & Co. v. Kinsel, 114 Ga. 390, 40 S. E. 300 (1901) (repairman
negligently left side of building in such condition that thieves entered and stole
plaintiff's goods; held, not liable, the subsequent intervening criminal act being
unforeseeable); Henderson v. Dade Coal Co., 100 Ga. 568, 28 S. E. 251 (1897)
(defendant, in charge of a convict under a convict lease system, was held not
liable when the felon escaped and raped plaintiff; the court holding the criminal
act unforeseeable even though the prisoner was known to be of "violent passions,
prone to desire for sexual intercourse"); Pinnell v. Yellow Cab Co., 77 Ga. App.
73, 47 S. E. 2d 774 (1948) (defendant's servant negligently picked up drunk
passenger after plaintiff had hired the taxicab; the second passenger shot the
first; held, plaintiff could not recover since the subsequent criminal act was unforeseeable); Hulsey v. Hightower, 44 Ga. App. 455, 161 5. E. 664 (1931) (defendant
gave his son a knife with which he intentially inflicted a serious wound upon
plaintiff; held, defendant could not forsee that his son, who was known to have
a reckless and negligent disposition, would commit the crime of attempted murder).
'Henderson v. Molting First Mortgage Corp., 184 Ga. 724, 193 S. E. 347
(1937) (defendant's servant, an apartment house janitor, maliciously shot plaintiff,
held, there could be no recovery on respondent superior, but there was a cause
of action for defendant's negligence in retaining a servant known to be of a
vicious character).
SFanelty v. Rogers Jewelers, 230 N. C. 694, 55 S. E. 2d 493 (1949) ; Ross
v. Sterling Drug Store, 225 N. C. 226, 34 S. E. 2d 64 (1945) (plaintiff injured
due to a defective "door check" which applied force to close the front door of
defendant's store; held, judgment for plaintiff reversed because of instructions
which could be interpreted to mean a storekeeper has absolute liability for injuries sustained by business invitees). See Note 18 N. C. L. Rav. 163 (1939)
for a discussion of the positive duty owed a business invitee.
'Peck v. Gerber, 154 Ore. 126, 59 P. 2d 675 (1936).
'While the assaulting guest had attempted to hit others, it was not shown
that he had done so.
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the defendant in the principal case might have been held liable on the
theory that he had failed to provide a safe shoppinf place for the deceased, a business invitee. The previous pointing of the pistol and
the probability of a continuation of this practice, as long as the pistol
was lying around, had rendered the place unsafe.
There was no allegation as to who was in charge of the store when
the injury was inflicted. If the defendant was present, support is lent
to the argument that he failed to use reasonable care in providing a
safe shopping place for the deceased since there is nothing to show
that he attempted to prevent the discharge of the pistol. If the defendant
was not present, it is possible that the son was in charge of the store.
This raises the question of defendant's liability based on respondeat
superior. In fact, the court itself raised this question, but held the
allegations insufficient to show an agency. 10
It has been suggested that the proprietor of a store be held absolutely liable for intentional torts committed by their servants. 1 This,
12
however, has not been done except in cases involving common carriers
and public service corporations.' 3 Nevertheless, a proprietor will be
held liable if he does not use reasonable care in the selection and retention of servants and refrain from putting the customer in a position
where it is likely that a tort will occur.14 The latter statement seems
particularly applicable to the principal case if an agency could be
established.
Not only did the plaintiff omit material allegations in his petition,
but the allegations are inconsistent. The plaintiff alleged that the son's
act was both malicious' 5 and negligent.' 6 As pointed out above, the
court construing the petition against the petitioner held the son's act
criminal and this in the face of the court's subsequent conclusion that
a cause of action in negligence was stated against the son.
In a jurisdiction which construes pleadings most strongly in favor
of the pleader, the decision would probably have been contra, since the
allegations are capable of the construction that the defendant was negli10 Skelton v. Gambrell, 80 Ga. App. 880, 57 S. E. 2d 694, 697 (1950). "Nor
do we think the mere allegation 'that said store was owned and operated by the
defendants named herein,' was sufficient to show that the son was acting as
servant or agent of the parents and within the scope of their employment."
" See Robinson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 216 N. C. 322, 324, 4 S.E. 2d 889,
890 (1939) (dissenting opinion).
12 Daniel v. Railroad, 117 N. C. 592, 23 S.E. 327 (1895).
"Munick v. City of Durham, 181 N. C. 188, 106 S.E. 665 (1921).
'See Note 18 N. C. L. REv. 163, 166.
' In the second allegation, the plaintiff alleged, "that this suit is brought for
the malicious homicide of petitioners' mother, and wife... " Skelton v. Gambrell, 80 Ga. App. 880, 57 S.E. 2d 694, 695 (1950).
" Plaintiff in his eighteenth allegation alleged, "That the defendant W. C.
Skelton, Jr., was negligent in the following ... " Skelton v. Gambrell, 80 Ga.
App. 880, 57 S.E. 2d 694, 695 (1950).
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gent in failing to foresee the intervening negligence of the son, who had
17
previously pointed the pistol at people in the store.
North Carolina follows the general rule that an intervening and
foreseeable negligent act will not insulate the original party's negligence. 8 There are very few cases in this state dealing with intervening
20
criminal acts 19 and in only one case was defendant held liable.
In cases of intervening negligence of third parties, there are North
Carolina cases which make a distinction between the active and the
passive negligence of the defendant. Where the negligence of the intervening third party is active at the time of the accident and the defend2
ant's negligence is passive, defendant has been relieved from liability. '
In the principal case, defendant's negligence might be regarded as
passive, unless it can be argued that there was a continuing duty to
protect the business invitee. Justice Seawell's opinion to the effect that
storekeepers should be responsible to customers for all acts of their
employees, criminal as well as negligent, is not applicable to the Georgia
case under discussion because there was no allegation that the son was
an employee or agent.
It is doubtful whether the Georgia court would deny the general
proposition that if the intervening act and resultant injury could reasonably have been foreseen by the defendant, he remains liable. The problem is one of the extent or scope of protection which the law affords in
these cases of intervening criminal or negligent acts. If the proprietor
of a store creates or maintains a risk of danger to his customers, it
would not be unreasonable to hold him responsible for the intervening
'7 Sullivan v. Creed, [1904] 2 K. B. 317 (defendant left gun inside hedge where
minor son found it and negligently shot the plaintiff).
" Rulane Gas Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 231 N. C. 270, 56 S. E. 2d
689 (1949) ; Henderson v. Powell, 221 N. C. 239, 19 S. E. 2d 876 (1942) ; Horton
v. Tel. Co., 141 N. C. 455, 463, 54 S. E. 299, 302 (1906). ". . . the test . . . is
whether the intervening act and the resultant injury is one that the author of the
primary negligence could have reasonably foreseen and expected."
"oWard v. Southern Railway Co., 206 N. C. 530, 174 S. E. 443 (1934) (plaintiff was killed when struck by a piece of coal thrown from defendant's car;
held, assuming defendant was negligent in allowing thieves to be on the train,
nevertheless, the plaintiff cannot recover since the intervening criminal act was
unforeseeable) ; Chancey v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 174 N. C. 351, 93 S. E. 834
(1917) (plaintiff, -who was robbed due to defendant's negligence in not properly
lighting its cars, was denied recovery since the intervening criminal act was unforeseeable).
'oBritton v. Atlanta & Charlotte Air-Line Ry., 88 N. C. 536 (1883) (defendant
held liable when his servant failed to protect plaintiff, a Negro, from an assault
by other passengers known to the servant to be reckless and dissatisfied with
plaintiff's presence).
" Montgomery v. Blades, 222 N. C. 463, 23 S. E. 2d 844 (1943), rehearing
denied, 223 N. C. 331, 26 S. E. 2d 567 (1943) (plaintiff injured when driver, of
car in which she was riding negligently ran into a pillow constructed in the street
by defendants; held, defendants' negligence was static while the drivers negligence
was active but for which the injury would not have occurred, therefore, defendant
not liable) ; Haney v. Town of Lincolnton, 207 N. C. 282, 176 S. E. 573 (1934);
see Note 13 N. C. L. R~. 245 (1935).
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act which might be foreseen as likely to happen as a result of that risk.
It has never been a requirement that the exact nature of the intervening
act be foreseeable.
PAUL K. PLUNKETr.
Torts--Liability of Parent for Willful Injury to Child
By the overwhelming weight of authority in this country an unemancipated minor may not bring an action for personal tort against his
parent.' The Supreme Court of Oregon has recently engrafted an
exception on this general rule, holding that an unemancipated minor
2
may maintain an action against his parent for a willful or malicious tort.
In the Oregon case, a father, intoxicated and accompanied by his
brother and son as passengers, drove his pickup truck at high speed at
night over a mountainous highway. An accident ensued which resulted
in the death of all the occupants of the truck. The court held that the
father's estate could be sued for the wrongful death of the unemancipated
minor, the majority regarding the case as one presenting "willful misconduct" for which the father should be held liable to his son.
With this decision another inroad has been made into the general
rule disallowing tort actions between unemancipated minors and their
parents. The action has been allowed heretofore in the case of a minor
but emancipated child ;3 where the child was of legal age but continued
to live at home with his parents ;4 where the suit was brought by or
against one in loco parentis;5and in negligence cases where the defendant is protected by liability insurance. 6 An unemancipated minor has
I Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891) ; Small v. Morrison, 185
N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12 (1923) ; McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S. W.
"Proprietary torts" between
644 (1903) ; see Note, 71 A. L. R. 1071 (1931).
parent and minor in matters affecting property and contract seem always to have
been freely recognized. Lamb v. Lamb, 146 N. Y. 317, 41 N. E. 26 (1895);
Myers v. Myers, 47 W. Va. 487, 35 S. E. 868 (1900); PaossER, HANDROOH OF
THE LAW OF TORTS 905 (1941).
, Cowgill v. Broock, 218 P. 2d 445 (Ore. 1950).
' Wood v. Wood, 135 Conn. 280, 63 A. 2d 586 (1948) ; Fowlkes v. Ray-O-Vac
Co., 52 Ga. App. 338, 183 S. E. 210 (1935) ; Oliveria v. Oliveria, 305 Mass. 297,
25 N. E. 2d 766 (1940); Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N. W. 763
(1908); Cafaro v. Cafaro, 14 N. J. Misc. 331, 184 Atl. 779 (Sup. Ct. 1936);
Crosby v. Crosby, 230 App. Div. 651, 246 N. Y. Supp. 384 (1930); Detwiler v.
Detwiler, 162 Pa. Super. 383, 57 A. 2d 426 (1948).
'Ledgerwood v. Ledgerwood, 141 Cal. App. 538, 300 Pac. 144 (1931) ; Farrar
v. Farrar, 41 Ga. App. 120, 152 S. E. 278 (1930); Ponder v. Ponder, 157 So.
627 (La. App. 1934); Weyan v. Weyan, 165 Miss. 257, 139 So. 608 (1932);
Taylor
v. Taylor, 232 S. W. 2d 382 (Mo. 1950).
5
Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N. E. 961 (1901); Dix v.
Martin, 171 Mo. App. 266, 157 S. W. 133 (1913); Clasen v. Pruhs. 69 Neb. 278,
95 N. W. 640 (1903) ; Stiber v. Norris, 188 Wis. 366, 206 N. W. 172 (1925).
'Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930); Lusk v. Lusk, 113
W. Va. 17, 166 S. E. 538 (1932); Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S. E. 2d
343 (1939); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Marchland, [1924] (Can.) S. C. R. 86, 13
B. R. C. 1135. For a discussion of this problem, see Note, 11 N. C. L. REV.
352 (1933).
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also been allowed to sue his mother under a wrongful death statute for
the death of the minor's father resulting from the mother's negligent
operation of an automobile.7
To this list may now be added actions in which the injury sustained
is the result of a willful or malicious tort. Authority on this point is
meager. A New York court, although denying recovery on a showing
of mere negligence, has indicated that an action would lie upon a showing of willful or malicious conduct.8 In Missouri the action has been
allowed on a showing of mere negligence.0
The policy of seeking to preserve domestic tranquility is the reason
most frequently given for denying the action.' 0 Some courts seem to
fear a breakdown of the family unit and a blow to parental discipline
and control." Others rely on the complete lack of adjudicated cases
at common law as precedent and would require action on the part of
the legislature to change the old rule.' 2 Other reasons given for denying the action are possibility of fraud'3 and depletion of the family
treasury. 4
The general rule, in so far as it tends to preserve the peace and
tranquility of the home, seems to be a wholesome one. Mere legal
prohibitions alone, however, will not hold together the family life.' 5 The
rule should not be exalted above ordinary common sense, or applied to
all factual situations in tort actions between a minor child and his
parent. As the Oregon court points out, it can hardly be said that an
uncompensated tort makes for peace in the family and respect for the
parent, especially if it be rape, 16 a brutal beating,' 7 or as in the present
case, a termination of the relation itself by death as the result of a
wild drunken ride down a dark mountain road. The other reasons
advanced by the court for nonliability are of doubtful validity, even with
regard to ordinary torts.'
But, assuming their validity, they do not
'Hale v. Hale. 312 Ky. 867, 230 S. W. 2d 610 (1950) ; Minkin v. Minkin, 336
Pa. 49, 7 A. 2d 461 (1939) ; Munsert v. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 229 Wis.
581, 281 N. W. 671 (1938).
'See Meyer v. Ritterbush, 196 Misc. Rep. 551, 553, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 595, 598
(Sup. Ct. 1949). Also, an unemancipated minor has been allowed to sue his
unemancipated minor sister in New York. 281 N. Y. 106, 22 N. E. 2d 254
(1939).
*Wells v. Wells, 48 S. W. 2d 109 (Mo. 1932) ; Dix v. Martin, 171 Mo. App.
266, 157 S. W. 133 (1913).
oRoller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905); Wick v. Wick, 192
Wis. 260, 212 N. W. 787 (1927) ; see McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HAMv. L. REv. 1030, 1056 (1930).
" Small v. Morrison. 185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12 (1923).
12
Fidelity Say. Bank v. Aulik, 252 Wis. 602, 32 N. W. 2d 613 (1948).
'a Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N. E. 961 (1901).
1,
Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
1
'Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N. Y. 106, 22 N. E. 2d 249 (1939).
1" TRoller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S. W. 644 (1903).
1
SSee McCurdy, Torts Between Personsin Domestic Relation, 43 HARv L.
Rrv. 1030, 1072-1077 (1930).
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seem persuasive enough to justify denying a child recovery for an injury willfully and maliciously inflicted upon him by his parent.
The North Carolina Supreme Court adopted the general rule of
nonliability in Small v. Morrison,19 a negligence case, notwithstanding
the vigorous dissent of Chief Justice Clark, which closely parallels the
opinion of the majority of the court in the Oregon case.20 However,
the question as to whether an unemancipated minor may sue his parent
for a willful or malicious tort does not seem to have been yet presented
in this state. The Oregon court, by refusing to apply a hard and fast
rule of nonliability to the facts in this case, has recognized a trend
which the North Carolina court should seriously consider when the
question is presented in this state.
EARL W. VAUGHN.

Trusts-Exercise by Will of a Reserved Power of Revocation
In Cohn v. Central National Bank of Richmond' the revocation
clause in an insurance trust agreement read:
"The right is reserved to the insured [settlor]; to revoke or
annul this agreement in whole or in part, and to modify the
terms in any respect . . . on the written demand of the insured,
the trustee shall deliver to him any or all of the policies held
under the terms of this agreement."
Held, the attempted exercise by will of the reserved power of revocation was ineffectual to revoke the trust.
It is clear that a settlor may validly reserve a power to revoke a
2
trust and stipulate the manner in which such power is to be exercised.
When a particular mode of revocation is specified in the reserved power
of revocation, however, it is essential that it be strictly complied with
in order to make the revocation effective.3 When the revocation pro1 185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12 (1923), 2 N. C. L. REv. 113 (1924).
20 Clark argues that neither the common law nor statutes deny the child a
right to sue his parent in tort and that the court should never create a precedent

upon a supposed public policy which will deprive anyone of just rights.

'191 Va. 12, 60 S. E. 2d 30 (1950).
'E.g., Nichols v. Emery, 109 Cal. 323, 41 Pac. 1089 (1895); Cramer v.
Hartford-Conn. Trust Co., 110 Conn. 22, 147 Atl. 139 (1929) ; Kelley v. Parker,
181 Ill. 49, 54 N. E. 615 (1899) ; Jones v. Old Colony Trust Co., 251 Mass. 309,
146 N. E. 716 (1925); Nat. Newark & E. Banking Co. v. Rosahl, 97 N. J. Eq.
74, 128 Atl. 586 (1925) ; Richardson v. Stephenson, 193 Wis. 89, 213 N. W. 673
(1927). The settlor may reserve a power to revoke the trust only during his
lifetime, or he may reserve also a power to revoke by will. 3 Scorr, TRusTs
§330.8 (1939). The settlor has power to revoke the trust if and to the extent
that by the terms of the trust he reserved such power. RESTATEMENT, TRuSTS

§330(l) (1935).
'Hill v. Cornwall & Bro.'s Assignee, 95 Ky. 512, 26 S. W. 540 (1894) (power
to revoke by deed is not exercised when deed is undelivered) ; Brown v. Fidelity
Co., 126 Md. 175, 94 Atl. 523 (1915) (settlor reserved power of revocation upon
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vision is ambiguously worded, as in the principal case, then the problem is one of interpretation by the courts as to whether the agreement
contemplated a revocation only during the settlor's lifetime or included
revocation at death by his will.4
The landmark case of Chase National Bank v.Tonagno,5 where the
trust agreement provided for "a written revocation filed with the trustee, executed by the settlor," indicates the criteria and factors to be
taken into account in determining the modes of revocation actually reserved. The court there said: "This trust indenture does not specifically provide whether these powers of modification must be exercised
during the lifetime of the settlor or whether they may be exercised by
will. However, this indenture provides that the power reserved shall
be exercised by filing with the trustee a written notice of the revocation,
modification or change. In such circumstances it seems clear that the
settlor intended that the power should be exercised only during her
lifetime." In the recent case of Leahy v. Old Colony Trust Co. 6 the
revocation provision read: "The trust indenture may be amended or
revoked at any time during the lifetime of the said J. M. L. by an
instrument in writing signed by her, and also by A. A. C. if she be
living." The court said that "it is settled that a power to revoke 'during the lifetime' of the settlor, means a revocation taking effect before
the death of the settlor, and it cannot be exercised by a will that in
the nature of things cannot take effect before the death of the testator."
giving 20 days' notice, same to be executed in office of trustee under hand and
seal, properly attested and acknowledged; settlor sent letter evidencing intent to
revoke and took no further action, held to be no revocation) ; In re Solomon's
Estate, 332 Pa. 462, 2 A. 2d 825 (1938) (where two settlors reserved to themselves power to modify jointly a trust agreement, the power was extinguished when
one of the settlors died and the trust was deemed irrevocable) ; Reese's Estate,
317 Pa. 473, 177 At. 742 (1935) (where the settlor reserved a right to revoke
by giving 60 days' notice, gave the notice, but died before the 60 days had elapsed.
there was no valid revocation); 4 BoGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEEs §996 (2d Ed.

1948);
(1935).i3 Scorr,

TRUSTS

§330.8 (1939);

RESTATsmENT, TRUSTS

§330, comment j

' Gal v. Union Nat. Bank of Little Rock, 203 Ark. 1000, 159 S. W. 2d 757

(1942) (reserved right to revoke by giving written notice at least six months
in advance; held, notice must be given in lifetime and there can be no valid
revocation by will) ; Broga v. Rome Trust Co., 151 Misc. 641, 272 N. Y. Supp.
101 (1934) (revocation provision was "grantor may, by instrument in writing,
delivered to the trustee, modify or alter this agreement"; attempted revocation
by will was ineffective) ; In re Shapley's Deed of Trust, 53 D. & C. 123, aff'd,
353 Pa. 499, 46 A. 2d 227 (1945) (right to revoke limited "to a proper instrument or instruments in writing executed by me and lodged with the trustee";
lodging of probated will so revoking held not a sufficient compliance); In re
Lyon's Estate, 164 Pa. 140, 63 A. 2d 415 (1947) (trust agreement provided that
30 days' notice be given to trustee, same not revoked by settlor's will) ; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS

§330, comment j (1935).

'172 Misc. 560, 14 N. Y. S. 2d 759 (1939). For case in accord both as to
facts and law see Kelley v. Snow, 185 Mass. 288, 70 N. E. 89 (1904).
893 N. E. 2d 238 (Mass. 1950).
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In the principal case7 the same reasoning was followed as the rei~ocation
provision was said to "carry with it the thought that whatever is done
to effect a revocation must be done in the lifetime of the settlor." The
court found no language authorizing the revocation of the trust agreement by will, or from which an inference to that effect could be drawn.
Conversely, where the settlor reserves a power to revoke only by
will, an attempted revocation during his lifetime is ineffective as it is
not in accord with the mode specified by the reserved power of
8
revocation.
A third situation exists where a power of revocation is reserved
without specifying the manner in which it is to be exercised. An example of this type of reserved power in its simplest form is "this trust
shall be revocable." It seems that this would allow the settlor to exercise his reserved power in any manner which clearly evidences his
intention to revoke.9
In the cases where a settlor attempts to revoke an inter vivos trust
by his will, or by an act during his life, and fails because he has not
reserved the power to revoke in the manner attempted, his latest intention has been thwarted. The remedy, however, was within the grasp of
the original draftsman. The settlor should be instructed as to his right
to reserve a power to revoke by an inter vivos transaction or by his
will. If the settlor is uncertain at the time as to which mode he will
in the future prefer to exercise, the draftsman, by clear and concise
language, should include both modes in the reserved power of revocation. This would leave no possibility of ambiguity. By the use of
this method the settlor's intent as to the mode of future revocations
could be effectuated, and the courts would be spared the troublesome
problem of interpreting such agreements.
J. C. JOHNSON, JR.

Wills-Pretermission Statute-Sufficiency of Life Insurance
As Provision for After-Born Child
1
Under the North Carolina pretermission statute, children born after

I Cohn v. Central Nat. Bank of Richmond, 191 Va. 12, 60 S. E. 2d 30 (1950).

'Underhill v. U. S. Trust Co., 227 Ky. 44, 13 S. W. 2d 502 (1929); Dickey

v. Goldsmith, 60 Misc. 258, 111 N. Y. Supp. 1025 (1908).

' Security Trust Co. v. Spruance, 20 Del. Ch. 195, 174 AtI. 285 (1934) ; Hoffa
v. Hough, 181 Md. 472, 30 A. 2d 761 (1943); Lambdin v. Dantzebecker, 169 Md.

240, 181 AtI. 353 (1935) ; Barnard v. Gantz, 140 N. Y. 249, 35 N. E. 430 (1893).

But cf. Mayer v. Tucker, 102 N. J. Eq. 524, 141 Atl. 799 (1928); Stone v.
Hackett, 12 Gray 227 (Mass. 1858).
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. §31-45 (1943): "Children born after the making of the
parent's will, and whose parent shall die without making any provision for them,
shall be entitled to such share and portion of the parent's estate as if he or she

had died intestate, and the rights of any such after-born child shall be a lien

on every part of the parent's estate, until his several share thereof is set apart in
the manner prescribed in §28-153 to 28-158."
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the making of the parent's will, for whom no provision is made, are
entitled to share in the testator's estate as if he had died intestate.
Recently in Williamson v. Williamson2 the question was raised as to
whether the procurement of a life insurance policy, naming as beneficiary a child born after the execution of the parent's will, constituted
the making of "any provision" for such child within the meaning of
the statute.
Under the facts of this case, the testator had one child living at the
time he executed a will devising his entire estate to his wife, but subsequently another child was born to the testator. Neither child was
mentioned nor provided for in the will. Later, however, the testator
procured a double indemnity life insurance policy under which the two
children were named as beneficiaries and each received $4,000 at his
death. The court, interpreting the statute, held that the benefits of the
policy did not constitute a provision for the after-born child. Had the
case not been decided on other grounds, the court would have reached
the absurd result of permitting the after-born to receive an intestate
share in the parent's estate to the exclusion of the other child.
In the instant case, the court based its decision on the earlier case
of Sorrell v. Sorrell s stating that the facts of both were on "all fours."
Yet, upon examination the two cases seem to be distinguishable. In
the principal case, the testator had a natural child living at the execution
of his will, while in the Sorrell case the testator had no children at
the time the will was executed, but later adopted one child prior to the
birth of another. Thus in the latter case, the facts strongly support
the contention that the testator did not entertain any idea whatsoever of
children at the time he executed his will. In the Williamson case, however, it is arguable that since the testator was cognizant of his living
child upon execution of the will, his intention was to exclude or disinherit all his children as a class. 4 Some jurisdictions, when presented
a fact situation similar to the instant case, have reached this result in
construing their pretermisison statutes. 5 Still, it must be noted that in
2232 N. C. 54, 59 S. E. 2d 214 (1950).
8193 N. C. 439, 137 S. E. 306 (1927).
'Leonard v. Enochs, 17 S. W. 437, 438 (Ky. 1891) (".. . it would be an
anomaly to hold that all the testator's living children-infants and all-were intentionally excluded as a class in the interest of the testator's wife, and the child
thereafter born, by reason of the accidental time of its birth, was not intentionally
omitted").
'ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 39, §10 (1935): "If, after making a last will and testament, a child shall be born to any testator, and no provision be made in such
will for such child, the will shall not on that account be revoked; but unless it

shall appear by such will that it was the intention of the testator to disinherit

such child, the devises and legacies by such will granted and given, shall be
abated in equal proportions to raise a portion for such child equal to that which

such child would have been entitled to receive out of the estate of such testator
if he had died intestate ...." Froelich v. Minwegen, 304 Ill. 462, 136 N. E. 669
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jurisdictions so holding, the pertinent statutes are more susceptible to
such interpretation than is the North Carolina statute. 6
Even if it be conceded that the two cases are not distinguishable
and the statutes of other jurisdictions more clearly permit the disinheritance theory, why has the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the
benefits of an insurance policy are not an adequate provision for afterborn children? In the principal case, the court speaks of the inherent
unsuitability of life insurance as a provision because of its indirectness
as ex parentis peovisione since it is not of reasonable substance and
(1922) (testator had 2 children living at the time he made his will leaving
everything to his wife, and thereafter 6 other children were born; court held
that testator manifested his intention to disinherit after-born children) ; Peet v.
Peet, 229 III. 341, 82 N. E. 376 (1907) (testator had a son living at time will was
executed leaving estate to his wife and another son was born thereafter; the
court found that will disclosed an intention that neither should take any interest
in the estate but that both should be cared for by their mother); Hawhe v.
Chicago & W. I. Ry., 165 Il. 561, 46 N. E. 240 (1897) (testator had 2 children
living at execution of will and another child born subsequently; court held fact
that testator had 2 children at time of making will to whom he made no allusion
was sufficient to show an intention to disinherit not only living children, but also
after-born children).
Ky. REv. STAT. §394.380(2) (1948) : "If a will is made when a testator has a
child living, and a child is born afterward, such after-born child, or any descendant
of his, if not provided for by any settlement, and neither provided for nor expressly
excluded by the will, but only pretermitted, shall succeed to the portion of the
testator's estate that he would have been entitled to if the testator had died
intestate .

. . ,"

Leonard v. Enochs, 92 Ky. 186, 17 S. W. 437 (1891)

(where

testator had a child living at the time will was executed leaving his estate to
his wife and another child was born 2 months after his death, court found that
since the living child was excluded by intentional omission, it was evident that
the exclusion was not intended to apply to the particular living child, but to all
testator's children as a class).
TENN. CODE ANN. §8131 (Williams 1934): "A child born after the making of
a will, either before or after the death of the testator, inclusive of a mother
testatrix, not provided for nor disinherited, but only pretermitted, in such will,
.and not provided for by settlement made by the testator in his lifetime, shall
succeed to the same portion of the testator's estate as if he had died intestate."
Fleming v. Phoenix Trust Co., 162 Tenn. 511, 39 S. W. 2d 277 (1931) (testator
had 2 children living at time of execution of will leaving everything to his wife,
and another child was born shortly thereafter; court held that statute not applicable
as it clearly appeared from will that testator intended to confer his estate upon
his wife and omitted all his children as a class, not merely the living ones);
Reeves v. Hager, 101 Tenn. 712, 50 S. W. 760 (1899) (testatrix had child living
at time will was made leaving everything to husband, and another child was
born subsequently; court found that testatrix, by failing to mention the two children, disinherited them in favor of their father).
Wis. STAT. §238.10 (1949) : "Where any child shall be born after the making
of his parent's will and no provision shall be made therein for him, such child
shall have the same share in the estate of the testator as if he had died intestate;
and the share of such child shall be assigned to him as provided by law in case
of intestate estates unless it shall be apparent from the will that it was the
intention of the testator that no provision should be made for such child." In re
Read's Will, 180 Wis. 497, 193 N. W. 382 (1923) (where testator had 5 children
living at time he made will leaving entire estate to wife and child born after
that date, court found testator manifested an intention to exclude all children from
sharing in the estate since it would be unreasonable that he would be more
solicitous for after-born children than for those he knew at the making of will).
' See notes 1 and 5 supra.
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value in presenti but only a possibility which must be fed to be kept
alive. This precise point has been raised in the New York court. That
court has held that although the possibility of the after-born child receiving the benefit of a provision is wholly contingent, it is still a sufficient provision to prevent the operation of the pretermission statute.7
In construing a statute8 very similar to the North Carolina statute, the
New York Court of Appeals reasoned that since a testator may meet
the possibility of after-born children by mere mention or a very general
provision in the will, as is also the law in North Carolina,9 "it would
be somewhat idle, if not inconsistent, to hold that in order to be effective
as a 'provision' a bequest or devise must be vested, certain and adequate."' 0 Accordingly, that jurisdiction has liberally interpreted its
statute so as not to efeat the intention of the testator and has held
that an after-born child, not mentioned in the will, is provided for
within the meaning of the statute by life insurance, 1 trust, 12 and Totten
3

trust.'

Both the language in early North Carolina cases declaring the purpose of the statute, and a "plain-meaning" interpretation thereof, lead
to the conclusion that the court could well have reached the New York
view in the principal case. The court has stated that the statute was
not designed to control a parent as to the provision he should make,
and that it was only intended to apply when the omission to provide for
7In re Kirk's Estate, 191 Misc. Rep. 473, 80 N. Y. S. 2d 378 (1948) ; In re
Kreutz' Will, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 402 (1944); In re Hagendorn's Will, 41 N. Y. S.
2d 491 (1943) ; In re Jones' Will, 134 Misc. Rep. 26, 234 N. Y. Supp. 316 (1929) ;
McLean v. McLean, 207 N. Y. 365, 101 N. E. 178 (1913). Contra: Minot v.
Minot,
17 App. Div. 521, 45 N. Y. Supp. 554 (1897).
8
N . Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW §26: "Whenever a testator shall have a child
born after the making of a last will, either in the lifetime or after the death of
such testator, and shall die leaving such child, so after-born, unprovided for by
any settlement, and neither provided for, nor in any way mentioned in such will,
every such child shall succeed to the same portion of such parent's real and personal estate, as would have descended or been distributed to such child, if such
parent had died intestate, and shall be entitled to recover; the same portion from
the devisees and legatees, in proportion to and out of the parts devised and bequeathed to them by such will." In re Bryant's Estate, 121 Misc. Rep. 102, 201
N. Y. Supp. 60 (1923) (court construed the word "settlement" as meaning "to
provide for" or "to make provision for").
Co., 189 N. C. 368, 127 S. E. 254 (1925).
'Rawls v. Durham Realty & Ins.178,
180 (N. Y. 1913).
" McLean v. McLean, 101 N. E.
"In re Kirk's Estate, 191 Misc. Rep. 473, 80 N. Y. S. 2d 378 (1948) ; In re
Kraston's Will, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 364 (1945); In re Kreutz' Will, 49 N. Y. S. 2d
402 (1944) ; In re Hagendorn's Will, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 491 (1943) ; I re Backer's
Estate, 148 Misc. Rep. 318, 266 N. Y. Supp. 47 (1933) ; In re Froeb's Estate, 143
Misc. Rep. 660, 257 N. Y. Supp. 851 (1931) ; In re Bryant's Estate, 121 Misc. Rep.
102, 201 N. Y. Supp. 60 (1923).
" Int re Von Finckenstein's Will, 179 Misc. Rep. 375, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 108
(1943) ; In re Curry's Will, 21 N. Y. S. 2d 544 (1940) ; accord, In re Bostwick's
Will,2 78 Misc. Rep. 695, 140 N. Y. Supp. 588 (1912).
n re Hartman's Estate, 55 N. Y. S. 2d 791 (1945).
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an after-born child was from inadvertence or mistake. 14 Also it has
been said that such provision as contemplated by the statute may be
made for the child by the parent either by will, gift, or by settlement,
before, contemporaneous with, or after the will is made.1 5 Further, the
use of the term "any provision" in the statute would seem to furnish
the basis for a holding by the court that the benefits of an insurance
policy are a sufficient provision within the meaning of the statute.16
Nevertheless, the court has continued to adhere to a strict construction
of the statute, thereby defeating its purport and intent. Alhough it has
been stated that the a'dequacy of the provision is not to be determined
by the court but by the testator,17 it appears that the North Carolina
Supreme Court has in effect determined that insurance is not an adequate provision under the pretermission statute.
As the court in the principal case expressed its obligation to stare
decisis, it would seem that a statutory amendment is necessary to
alleviate the harsh result and the strict interpretation that has developed in construing the after-born statute. Such action is desirable if
the original purpose and intent of the statute are to be effectuated. The
following statutory amendment is proposed:
Children born or adopted after the making of the parent's will,
and whose parent shall die without making any provision for
them whatsoever in such will or otherwise or without indicating
in such will an intent to exclude them therefrom, shall be entitled to such share and proportion of the parent's estate as if he
or she had died intestate, and the rights of any such after-born
child shall be a lien on every part of the parent's estate, until
his several share thereof is set apart in the manner prescribed
in §28-153 to 28-158.18
DAVID L. STRAIN,
1

Jit.

,Flanner v. Flanner, 160 N. C. 126, 75 S. E. 936 (1912) ; Thompson v. Julian,
C. 309, 45 S. E. 636 (1903); Meares v. Meares, 26 N. C. 192 (1843).
133 N.
' 5 Flanner v. Flanner, 160 N. C. 126, 75 S. E. 936 (1912).
26 See Meares v. Meares, 26 N. C. 192, 197 (1843)
(". . . the statute only
provides for the case where the parent dies without having made provision for
the child, which means, without making any provision .. ." [italics supplied]).
17 King v. Davis, 91 N. C. 142 (1884) ; Meares v. Meares, 26 N. C. 192 (1843).
11 Proposed changes to N. C. GEir. STAT. §31-45 (1943) are indicated by italics.
See Second Report of the Commission on the Revision of the Laws of North
Carolina Relating to Estates (1939), p. 87.

